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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this Court over appeals from final
Public Service Commission orders is generally conferred by
Article VIIIf Section 3 of the Utah Constitution, and sections
63-46b-16 and 78-2-2(3)(e)(i) of the Utah Code.

However, while

this Court may have general appellate jurisdiction over this
matter, it lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to the
Homeowners' failure to comply with the requirements of various
sections of the Utah Code.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether this appeal must be dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction due to the Homeowners' failure to
comply with the requirements of sections 54-7-15, 63-46b-12 and
63-46b-14 of the Utah Code.
2.

Whether this appeal must be dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction due to the Homeowners' failure to
comply with the requirements of sections 54-7-13 and 54-7-14 of
the Utah Code.
3.

Whether this appeal must be dismissed for failure

to comply with the requirements of section 54-7-9(3) of the Utah
Code.
4.

Whether the Homeowners' constitutional challenge to

standby fees under the equal protection clauses of the United
States Constitution and/or the Utah Constitution must be
dismissed for failure to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality.

5.

Whether any remaining issues or arguments must be

dismissed due to deficiencies in the record and/or the lack of
specific findings and conclusions in the record regarding standby
fees.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

In bringing this appeal, the Homeowners are seeking
judicial review of the validity and reasonableness of standby
fees ordered by the Public Service Commission (Commission) for
Foothills back in 1985. However, for reasons set forth herein,
the Homeowners' appeal is fatally flawed and must be dismissed.
Furthermore, the record on appeal is inadequate to allow
consideration of the merits on appeal. A brief chronological
review of the factual background will help clarify the relevant
facts and issues on appeal.
B.

Factual Background.

Standby fees were first instituted for Foothills in
Case No. 85-2010-01; by interim order dated September 6, 1985 and
later by final order dated March 17, 1986.

Copies of said orders

are not contained in the record on appeal and are, therefore,
attached hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B" respectively and by this
reference incorporated herein.

Although the Homeowners

participated with counsel in all hearings upon which these orders
were based, they never objected to, challenged or sought review
of those orders.
On July 17, 1987, Foothills filed proposed tariff
modifications, other than standby fees, with the Commission in
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Case No. 88-2010-01, however, primarily dealt with
proposed changes in Foothills' rates and on March 28, 1988, this
case was stayed pending the outcome of a Third Judicial District
Court action involving the ownership of the water system.

Again,

since this docket was not included in the record on appeal, a
copy of the stay order is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and by
this reference incorporated herein.

Therefore, the Commission

has never issued an order in Case No. 88-2010-01 addressing the
validity of standby fees.
On March 29, 1988, the day after the Commission had
stayed the docket in which the Homeowners had challenged the
validity of standby fees, the Homeowners filed their Motion for
Review or Rehearing in Case No. 87-2010-T03, the case which dealt
with certain tariff modifications other than
at 0098-0100.)

standby fees.

(R.

However, in addition to these relevant issues on

review, the Homeowners now attempted to boot-strap their
challenge on standby fees into their Motion for Rehearing in Case
No. 87-2010-T03.

(R. at 0099, paragraph 3.)

Prior to this time,

the Homeowners had not challenged standby fees in Case No. 872010-T03 and the Commission had never issued any order addressing
the validity of standby fees on which the Homeowners could seek
review or rehearing.

(R. at 0109.)

On April 7, 1988, the Commission issued its order on
rehearing in Case No. 87-2010-T03.

(R. at 0101-0103.)

In

addition to addressing the relevant issues on review, the
Commission's order also summarily dismissed, in one sentence, the
Homeowners' attempt to boot-strap their challenge to standby fees
into Case No. 87-2010-T03.

(R. at 0102, paragraph 3.)
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standby fees in question.

However, as indicated by the prefatory

remarks of these orders, the interim order dated September 6,
1985 was based upon certain proffers of evidence and stipulated
facts at a hearing held on August 28, 1985.

No transcript of

this hearing and no copies of such proffers and stipulations
appear in the record.

The final order dated March 17, 1986 was

based upon extensive evidentiary hearings held on January 22, 23,
24, 27 and 28, 1986. Again, no transcript of these hearings and
no copies of any written testimony and/or documentary evidence
presented at these hearings appear in the record on appeal.
Furthermore, in the final order of March 17, 1986, the
Commission took administrative notice of, and relied upon as
additional support, two other dockets in which the Commission had
imposed standby fees.

(Exhibit "B" at page 26, paragraph 22.)

However, the record on appeal does not contain any of the
evidence presented or even the resulting orders from these other
dockets.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Sections 54-7-15, 63-46b-12 and 63-46b-14 of the

Utah Code require a party to petition the Commission for review
or rehearing if it is dissatisfied with an order of the
Commission.

As a result of the Homeowners' failure to do this,

this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal.
Therefore, the Homeowners' appeal must be dismissed.
2.

Inasmuch as the Homeowners actively participated

with counsel in all hearings upon which Foothills' standby fees
are based and failed to seek timely review of the Commission's

final order thereon
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The Homeowners' constitutional challenge to standby
! t Mi! i

Constitution and the Utah Constitution does not overcome the
presumption of constitutionality set forth in Utah case law.
Indeed, after including this allegation in their statement of
issues, the Homeowners never even address this issue in either
their brief on appeal or their request for agency action.
Therefore, these issues must be dismissed from this appeal.
5.

Finally, any remaining issues or arguments of the

Homeowners must be dismissed due to deficiencies in the record on
appeal.

Under any standard of review, this Court is required to

review the findings, conclusions or determinations of the
Commission which address the issue on appeal.

In the instant

case, the record contains no such findings, conclusions or
determinations for this Court to review.

Ordinarily this matter

could be remanded to allow the Commission to correct these
deficiencies.

However, as indicated above, the Homeowners'

request for agency action is defective and the Commission may not
entertain such defective requests.
be dismissed.

Therefore, this appeal should

In the event the Homeowners wish to continue their

challenge of standby fees, they may do so by following correct
procedures which would allow the Commission to address the merits
of their challenge prior to review by this Court.
ARGUMENT
I. THIS APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION DUE TO THE HOMEOWNERS' FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTIONS 54-7-15, 63-46b-12 AND 63-46b-14 OF
THE UTAH CODE.
In bringing this appeal, the Homeowners have failed to
meet the prerequisites to review by this Court imposed by
statute.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15 states, in pertinent part:

J.^_ 7 _^J. R e v ^ e w Q r r e h e a r j _ n g fay c o m m JL S S i 0 n
Application — Procedure — Prerequisite t o court
action

(1) Before seeking ju^,-^- r^vie .
commission's action, any party, stoc
bondholder, or other person pecuniarily mtt
*.
the public utility who is dissatisfied with an orae^
the commission shall meet the requirements of this
section.
(2) (a) After any order or decisioi i has been made by
the commission, any party to the action or proceeding,
or any stockholder or bondholder or other party
pecuniarily interested in the public utility affected
may apply for rehearing of any matters determined in
the action or proceeding .
(b) No applicant may urge or rely on any ground
not set forth in the application in an appeal to any
c o j 1 rt.

(Emphasi s added.)
Furthermore, Utal I Code A :iiu

iu li J 4tiLj-l/l anil b

4 lib II «J

of the Admini stxative Procedures A c t state, in pertinent part:
fill" 4fih Ill 2

1! gen cy re si i e w

Prniwlure

| 1) If a s ta I::." i be or the agency's rules permit
parties to ai \y adjudicative proceeding to seek review
of an order by the agency or a superior agency, the
aggrieved party may file a written request for review
within 30 days after the issuance of the order with the
person or entity designated for that purpose by statute
or rule.
63-46b-14. Judicial Review —
administrative remedies.

Exhaustion of

(1) A par ty aggrieved may obtain j udicial review «of
final agency action, except in actions where judicid li
review is expressly prohibited by statute, only after
exhausting all administrative remedies available ....
(Empl lasi s added,)
Therefore, before a pa rty can appeal a Commission order

C :::: mm :i ssiox i:

ai :i, original order and ai I ::: rder oi i review or

• dismissal thereof.

Failure to meet the jurisdictional

prerequisites necessary for judicial review by this Court
requires dismissal of the appeal.
This Court recently had the opportunity to rule on this
very issue in the case of Williams v. Public Service Commission
of Utah, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988) where the Court stated, in
pertinent part:
Prior to deciding the substantive questions presented
by the parties, this Court must ascertain whether it
has subject matter jurisdiction over the petitions and
the appeal before it, * * * The petition to review the
PSC order dismissing American Paging's application for
a certificate is governed by section 54-7-15 . . . •
This Court examined section 54-7-15 and its effects
upon the Court's jurisdiction in Utah Department of
Business Regulations v. Public Service Commission, 602
P.2d 696 (Utah 1979)- There, the petitioner failed to
follow the process outlined in section 54-7-15 and
instead filed a petition with this Court. We found
that section 54-7-15 constitutes a "jurisdictional
prerequisite" to any judicial review and that "(w)here
the outlined procedures (in section 54-7-15) have not
been complied with, this Court is without jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the dispute." Id. at 699.
In the instant case, neither American Paging nor any of
the ^intervening parties filed an application for
rehearing with the PSC prior to seeking a writ of
certiorari. Thus even though they are interested
parties, their failure to apply for rehearing within
twenty days of the Commission's issuance of its order
divests this Court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(1) (1986). Additionally,
section 54-7-15 states that petitioning parties can
only bring those grounds before this Court that were
argued in the application for rehearing, jld. In the
absence of an application for rehearing, the parties
are left without anything to appeal. Therefore, this
Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over the
petition and will not review the PSC's dismissal of
American Paging's application for a certificate.
Id. at 46.

(Emphasis added.)

This Court went on to note that public policy supports
this conclusion:

Requiring p a r t i e s t o pgc p roceec |i n g S to file a petition
for rehearing prior to seeking judicial review provides
the PSC an opportunity to correct --J: manifest errors
in its own decisions. The PSC's expertise and
experience in public utility regulation place it ii 1 the
best position to review and expeditiously resolve any
problems with its own decisionsf orders, or rules.
This process also conserves judicial resources by
allowing some parties to obtain a resolution of their
conflicts without involving the expense and t:i me of
formal appellate revi ew
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seeking judicial review by LIIXL CouiL vluiates the provisions ol

Utah Code Ann. §§54-7-15, 63-46b-12 and 63-46b-14. Therefore,
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the
merits of this appeal and the Homeowners' appeal must be
dismissed.
II. THIS APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION DUE TO THE HOMEOWNERS' FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
SECTIONS 54-7-13 AND 54-7-14 OF THE UTAH CODE.
This Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
this matter since this appeal, without a prior order of the
Commission addressing the merits of the Homeowners' challenge,
amounts to a collateral attack upon the Commission's final order
of March 17, 1986 establishing standby fees for Foothills.

Utah

Code Ann. § 54-7-14 provides:
In all collateral actions or proceedings the orders and
decisions of the commission which have become final
shall be conclusive.
The Division recognizes, however, that the Commission
retains jurisdiction to rescind, alter or amend it previous
orders pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-13,
which states, in pertinent part:
The commission may at any time, upon notice to the
public utility affected and after opportunity to be
heard as provided in the case of complaints, rescind,
alter or amend any order or decision made by it.
In the case of Bowen Trucking, Inc. v. Public Service
Commission, 559 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah 1977), this Court considered
this issue and based its decision, in part, on the following
language used by the California Supreme Court:
It is true that the commission's decisions and orders
ordinarily become final and conclusive if not attacked
in the manner and within the time provided by law.
(Citations) This is not to say, however, that such a
decision is res judicata in the sense in which that

doctrine is applied in t h e law courts. """itations)
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III. THIS APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 54-7-9(3) OF THE UTAH
CODE.
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-9(3) states, in pertinent part:
(3) No request for agency action shall be
entertained by the commission concerning the
reasonableness of any rates or charges of any gas,
electrical, water, sewerage, or telephone corporation,
unless the request is signed by;
*

*

*

(b) by not less than 25 consumers or purchasers,
or prospective consumers or purchasers, of the gas,
electricity, water, sewerage, or telephone service.
(Empha sis added.)
In the instant case, the request for agency action was
the Petition for Declaratory Order which was signed only by
Robert A. Bentley, counsel for the Homeowners Association whose
president is a standby customer of Foothills.

This violation of

section 54-7-9(3) is particularly relevant in this case because
Mr. Bentley represents conflicting interests within the
Homeowners Association.

The Homeowners Association is comprised

not only of standby customers but also connected customers.

At

the time of the Commission's final order in Case No. 85-2010-01,
there were 63 connected customers and only 54 standby customers.
The connected customers have already complained about the high
water rates they have to pay as a result of the Commission's
orders in Case No. 85-2010-01.

The Homeowners even sent a letter

to Governor Bangerter which, inter alia, stated:

"We ended up

with the highest water rates in the State of Utah...."
0003-0006, specifically at 0004.)

(R. at

If standby fees were

invalidated, as recommended by Mr. Bentley, only the standby
customers within the association, such as its president, would

benefit and the connected customers would be forced to pay even
higher rates for their water.

Arguably, section 54-7-9(3) may

have been enacted to avoid, or at least minimize, this very
conflict.
Inasmuch as the Commission is prohibited from
entertaining requests for agency action which do not comply with
the foregoing statutory requirements, this Court should not
judicially review this one. As previously indicated, the
Commission has never issued an order addressing the merits of the
Homeowners' challenge to standby fees.

From the record it is not

clear whether this is a result of section 54-7-9(3) or as a
result of Case No. 88-2010-01 having been stayed.

In any event,

the Commission correctly has never issued an order which
addresses the merits of the Homeowners' flawed petition.
Therefore, as a result of the Homeowners' failure to comply with
the requirements of section 54-7-9(3), as well as the lack of a
Commission order addressing the merits of the flawed petition,
this appeal must be dismissed.
IV. THE HOMEOWNERS' CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO
STANDBY FEES UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION AND/OR THE UTAH CONSTITUTION MUST BE
DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY.
A.

Standard of Review.

In the case of J.J.N.P. Company v. State, Etc., 655
P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982), this Court considered a constitutional
challenge based on the equal protection clauses of both the
United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution and held:
A presumption of constitutionality is extended to
statutes not affecting fundamental rights or based on

suspect classifications and that presumption is
sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of the
classification created by a statute unless the
classification creates an invidious discrimination or
bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose. (Citations omitted.)
Since the standby fees established by the Commission
under its authority of sections 54-4-1 and 54-4-4 of the Utah
Code do not affect fundamental rights and are not based on
suspect classifications, the foregoing standard of review is
applicable to the equal protection challenges of the Homeowners.
B. Analysis.
The Division is unaware of any case law, and the
Homeowners have cited to none, which strikes down standby fees on
constitutional grounds.

Indeed, none of the cases cited by the

Homeowners even address the question of equal protection.

The

only case cited by the Homeowners which even remotely dealt with
a constitutional question is Augenbaugh v. Board of Supervisors
of Tuolumne County, 188 Cal.Rptr. 523 (App. 1983) and that case
1) addressed the question of procedural due process rather than
equal protection and 2) upheld the validity of standby fees.
The Homeowners' brief itself never even mentions "equal
protection" after including it as their first issue on appeal.
The Homeowners' initial Petition for a Declatory Order likewise
does not address "equal protection" after including it as an
issue.

Since neither the Homeowners' initial petition nor their

brief on appeal addresses equal protection beyond their statement
of issues, they certainly cannot be found to have carried their
burden in overcoming the presumption of constitutionality as set
forth in J.J.N.P., supra.

This failure to even address this

issue precludes further analysis and this argument of the
Homeowners must be dismissed as without merit.
Furthermore, the Homeowners' initial petition never
alleged lack of notice or procedural due process violations.

The

Homeowners are barred from now raising this new issue on appeal.
See Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(b) and Williams, supra.

In

addition, the Homeowners' active participation, with
representation of counsel, at the hearings which resulted in the
Commission's interim order of September 6, 1985 and the final
order of March 17, 1986 imposing standby fees, is sufficient to
meet the requirements of notice and procedural due process.
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983).

See

Therefore, this

argument of the Homeowners must also be dismissed as without
merit.
V. ANT REMAINING ISSUES OR ARGUMENTS MUST BE DISMISSED
DUE TO DEFICIENCIES IN THE RECORD AND/OR THE LACK OF SPECIFIC
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THE RECORD REGARDING STANDBY FEES.
A.

Relevant Statutes.

The Homeowners' petition alleged that the Commission's
order imposing standby fees "exceeded the scope of authority
given to the commission to set reasonable and just utility rates
as provided in UCA 54-1-2 and/or UCA 54-3-1."

However, section

54-1-2 merely allows the Public Service Commission to succeed to
the powers and duties previously held by the Public Utilities
Commission of Utah.

Section 54-3-1 governs the duties of public

utilities rather than the authority of the Commission over public
utilities.

The Homeowners are challenging the authority of the

Commission to order standby fees rather than claiming that

Foothills acted independent of Commission orders in charging
standby fees. Similarly, section 54-3-8 prohibits a public
utility from charging preferential rates, arguably rates that are
different than those ordered by the Commission.
Chapter 4 of Title 54 specifically governs the
authority of the Commission over public utilities and is so
entitled.

However, prior to their brief on appeal, the

Homeowners have never even cited to this chapter.

In actuality,

section 54-4-1 sets forth the Commission's general jurisdiction
over public utilities and section 54-4-4 governs the Commission's
authority over the classification and fixing of rates.

Those

sections provide, in pertinent part:
54-4-1.

General jurisdiction.

The commission is hereby vested with power and
jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public
utility in this state, and to supervise all of the
business of every such public utility in this state,
and to do all things, whether herein specifically
designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary
or convenient in the exercise of such power and
jurisdiction . . . .
54-4-4. Classification and fixing of rates after
hearing.
(1) Whenever the commission shall find after a
hearing that the rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges
or classifications, or any of them demanded, observed,
charged or collected by any public utility for any
service or product or commodity, or in connection
therewith, including the rates or fares for excursion
or commutation tickets, or that the rules, regulations,
practices or contracts, or any of them, affecting such
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges or
classifications, or any of them, are unjust,
unreasonable, discriminatory or preferential, or in
anywise in violation of any provisions of law, or that
such rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges or
classifications are insufficient, the commission shall
determine the just, reasonable or sufficient rates,
fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, rules,

regulations, practices or contracts to be thereafter
observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order
as hereinafter provided.
(Empha sis added.)
This is exactly what the Commission did in establishing
standby fees for Foothills back in 1985 and any request for
agency action by the Homeowners challenging the reasonableness of
such rates must comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §§
54-7-9(3) and 54-7-13 before it can be considered.
B.

Standard of Review.

This Court stated in Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Company v. Public Service Commission, 535 P.2d 1143,
1147 (Utah 1975) that the Commission's "proceedings and findings
are presumed to be correct unless they are capricious or
arbitrary or are not supported by the evidence."

Therefore, the

Homeowners have the burden of establishing that the Commission's
order on review is incorrect.

If the Homeowners are unable to

meet this burden, then their appeal must be dismissed.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) of the Administrative
Procedures Act states, in pertinent part:
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if,
on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that
a person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on
which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional
on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction
conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful
procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to
follow prescribed procedure;

(f) the persons taking the agency action were
illegally constituted as a decision-making body or were
subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a
determination of fact, made or implied by the agency,
that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior
practice, unless the agency justifies the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
(Emphasis added.)
Although this Court has frequently addressed its scope
of review of Commission orders, it apparently has not had the
opportunity to do so under the foregoing statute.

Prior

decisions of this Court have been based upon section 54-7-16
which, with the enactment of the Administrative Procedures Act,
has since been repealed.

Nevertheless, this Court's statements

concerning its scope of review of Commission orders are still
relevant and should be considered.
The Homeowners' brief in this area is grossly
deficient.

Although their brief is careful to point out

statements by this Court that the Commission has "no inherent
regulatory power (sic) other than those expressly granted or
clearly implied by statute," their brief ignores additional
statements by this Court which elaborate thereon and which
specifically address this Court's scope of review.
For example, the Homeowners cited the case of Mountain
States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Public Service

on

Commission, 754 P.2d 928 (Utah 1988) but did not acknowledge that
this Court also stated:
Utah Code Ann- § 54-4-4 (1986) gives the
Commission broad discretion in establishing rates for
public utilities. See Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 682 P.2d 859, 860. Any activities that
are related to rate making are therefore subject to the
Commission's powers in this area.
Id. at 931-932.
In Kearns-Tribune, supra, this Court also stated:
The lack of explicit statutory authority to "regulate
advertising," however, is not dispositive of the
question before us because the PSC certainly has
considerable latitude in performing its rate-regulation
function. Any activities of a utility that actually
affect its rate structure would necessarily be subject
to some degree to the PSC's broad supervisory powers in
relation to rates. The question, then, is whether the
activity the Commission is attempting to regulate is
closely connected to its supervision of the utility's
rates and whether the manner of the regulation is
reasonably related to the legitimate legislative
purpose of rate control for the protection of the
consumer.
Id. at 860.
Regarding the different types of review that are
possible when reviewing Commission orders, this Court recently
stated in

Williams, supra:

When reviewing the PSC's interpretation of general
questions of law, this Court applies a correction-oferror standard, granting no deference to PSC decisions.
Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658
P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 1983). This Court will afford
great deference to PSC findings on matters of basic
fact, upholding those findings based on any evidence of
substance. Id. at 608-09. For matters of ultimate
fact, mixed findings of fact and law, and the PSC's
interpretation of the operative provisions of the
statutory law it is empowered to administer, PSC
findings must be rationally based and are set aside
only if they are imposed arbitrarily or capriciously or
are beyond the tolerable limits of reason. Id. at 60912. The statutes governing the jurisdiction of the PSC
fall within this third, intermediate category. Thus,

we will grant deference to the PSC's determination of
its own jurisdiction if that determination is within
the tolerable limits of reason.
Id. at 50.
C. Analysis.
From the foregoing discussion of this Court's scope of
review it should be readily apparent that regardless of the type
of review which might be involved, each requires as a basis for
review some finding, conclusion or determination in the record
upon which the Commission order was based.

In the instant case,

the record contains no such findings, conclusions or
determinations upon which this Court might review the validity or
reasonableness of standby fees.

The record on appeal is

hopelessly deficient in this regard.
It is entirely possible that during the rate case
portion of Case No. 85-2010-01 (or in Case Nos. 83-076-01 and 85570-01 cited therein as additional support) that the Commission
imposed standby fees for reasons similar to those stated by the
Virginia State Corporation Commission in In Re Lake Monticello
Service Company, 57 PUR 4th 155, 166 (1983):
However, I believe there are compelling reasons for
recommending the adoption of an availability fee, as
proposed by the company, in this case. First and
foremost, absentee landowners do have a real interest
in seeing the system maintained and kept ready for
their use in the future. An adequate water and sewer
system is a benefit to them personally, and also
increases the value of their property. Secondly, as
the protestant has pointed out, a significant, though
perhaps unquantifiable portion of the operation and
maintenance expense incurred by the company is expended
on a system which is too large, in some respects, for
the current customer level. It is unfair to call upon
current usage customers to bear all of such expenses.

In addition, the Commission could have considered the
added fire protection benefits afforded to all property owners
within the Foothills certificated area.

However, the record on

appeal does not contain any findings, conclusions or
determinations to show what the Commission considered when it
established standby fees for Foothills back in 1985.

From the

record, it is also unknown exactly what position the Homeowners
took when they participated in the hearings which led to those
rates, other than the fact that they did not challenge the
standby fee at that time.

It is very likely that the Homeowners,

at that time, supported the concept of standby fees. After all,
including standby fees in Foothills' rate structure directly
benefited connected customers within the Homeowners Association
(whose numbers exceeded the number of standby customers.) Again,
however, the record on appeal is not sufficiently complete to
make such a determination.
The Homeowners do concede in their brief, however,
that:
a utility should be compensated for the unused capacity
it must maintain in order to meet the service
requirements of new customers . . . .
As their alternative to standby fees, the Homeowners suggest
increasing connection charges —

a suggestion which certainly was

not part of their initial petition and one which may or may not
have already been considered by the Commission in the rate case
portion of 85-2010-01.

In any event, this suggestion is barred

by section 54-7-15(2)(b) from now being raised in this appeal and
only serves to illustrate the need to consider Foothills' entire

rate structure when evaluating standby fees.

The Homeowners have

acknowledged that the elimination or reduction of the standby fee
must necessarily be accompanied by an increase in Foothills'
other rates.

Therefore, judicial review of the validity and/or

reasonableness of standby fees is not presently possible due to
the substantial deficiencies in the record on appeal.
Ordinarily, this Court could remand this case for the
Commission to correct the deficiencies.

However, as indicated

above, the Homeowners' initial petition did not meet the
threshold requirements of section 54-7-9(3).

Therefore, on

remand, the Commission is still prohibited from entertaining the
Homeowners' flawed request for agency action.

As a result, if

the Homeowners wish to continue their challenge of standby fees,
they must file a new and proper request for agency action with
the Commission and follow correct procedures which would allow
the Commission to address the merits of their challenge prior to
judicial review by this Court.

Therefore, the Homeowners' appeal

should be dismissed rather than remanded.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Division respectfully
requests this Court to dismiss this appeal.
Dated this 7*W^day

of April, 1989,
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT A

Second Interim Report and Order
Case No. 85-2010-01
Issued: September 6, 1985

EXHIBIT B

Report and Order
Case No. 85-2010-01
Issued: March 17, 1986

EXHIBIT C

Homeowners1 Petition for Declaratory
Order - Case No. 88-2010-01

EXHIBIT D

Stay Order - Case No. 88-2010-01
Issued: March 28, 1988

EXHIBIT A

- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In the Matter of the Application Of FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY,
INC. for a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity to
Operate as a Public Utility.

CASE NO. 85-2010 -01
SECOND INTERIM REPORT
AND ORDER
Certificate No. 2151

ISSUED:

September 6, 1985

Appearances:
For

Foothills Water Company,
Inc., Applicant

Steven R. Randle
Lee Kapalowski, and
Dean H. Becker

*

Hi-Country Estates Home
Owners1 Association,
Protestant

Brian W. Burnettf
Assistant Attorney
General

"

Division of Public
Utilities, Department of
Business Regulation,
State of Utah, Intervenor

Ralph J. Marsh

By the Commission:
Pursuant to notice duly served, a Prehearing Conference
in the above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on
August 28, 1985 before Kent Walgren, Administrative Law Judge for
the Utah Public Service Commission at the Commission Offices at
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.

At the Prehearing

Conference certain proffers were made and facts stipulated to and
the Administrative Law Judge took official notice of Exhibit 3 of
Applicants original Application and Administrative Law Judge,
having been advised in the premises, now makes and enters the
following recommended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Interim Report and Order,

CASE NO. 85-2010-01
- 2 FINDINGS OF FACT
1«

For purposes of establishing interim rates, we find

that Foothills Water Company, Inc. ("Foothills" or "Applicant")
pumped a total of 37,000,000 gallons of water in 1984.

Of that

amount, 16,000,000 gallons were used by the residents of HiCountry Estates, 16,000,000 gallons were used by Jesse H. Dansie
("Dansie") under a Well Lease dated April 7, 1977 (Exhibit 4 ) ,
and the remaining 5,000,000 we attribute to (Exhibit 4 ) , and the
remaining 5,000,000 we attribute to leakage.

During 1984 the

average resident of Hi-Country Estates used approximately 20,000
gallons of water per month.
2.
fifty-nine

Foothills has sixty-four

(59) standbys.

(64) water hook-ups and

Foothills can reasonably expect to

collect about 65 percent of its standby fees.
3.

Applicant needs to be able to cover the following

monthly expenses in order to continue operating on an interim
basis:
(a)

Insurance

(b) Well Lease Payment
(c)

Power

(d)

Property Taxes

$131.92
$600.00
$1600.00
$266.67

(e) Maintenance and Operation

$1774.60

Total Monthly Costs

$4373.19

Pursuant to paragraph E.5. of its Well Lease with Dansie, Applicant is entitled to collect the power costs of pumping water
supplied to Dansie.

We attribute half of the leakage to Dansie

CASE NO. 85-2010-01
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and

find that the customers

should be responsible

for

or $800.00, of the $1600.00 monthly cost of power.
rates which generate $3573.19

one-half,

Thus, interim

in monthly income are needed.

The

figures for insurance, well lease, power and property taxes were
obtained
figure
by

from Applicant's

for monthly maintenance

dividing

costs

Amended

by

twelve

figures
rates.

Applicant's

are

(see

1984

yearly

for

Since Applicant's

Schedule

and operating

original

reasonable

Application

costs was

maintenance

application,

purposes

ratebase

of

"A";

and

Exhibit

obtained
operating

3) .

establishing

is disputed,

no

the

These
interim

depreciation

expenses or return on equity can be granted at this time.
4.

The

following

interim

rates

are

reasonable

and

should generate sufficient income to allow the Applicant to cover
the expenses allowed in paragraph 3:
(a)

$27.50 minimum per month per hook-up for the first

5000 gallon block of water.
(b)
produced:

SI.50

per

Revenue produced:
1000

gallons

over

$1760.00.
5000.

Revenue

Revenue

produced:

$1440.00.
(c)

Monthly

standby

fee:

$10.00.

$383.50.
Total Monthly Revenue:
5.

For some years prior to 1985, Foothills charged its

customers a yearly
and

$1.25

between

per

the

Foothills

$3583.35

fee of $400.00

1000

parties

reduced

gallons
(Exhibit

for the first 325,000

thereafter.
1,

as

In

amended

its claim by 2 5 % — f r o m

the
on

gallons

Stipulation
the

record),

$400.00 to $300.00

per

CASE NO. 85-2010-01
- 4 year.

Paragraph 10 of the Stipulation states:

"...any dis-

agreements concerning the interpretation or application of the
terms of this Stipulation shall be resolved by the Public Service
Commission...w

Paragraph

7 of the Stipulation

is silent and

therefore ambiguous as to the amounts Applicant is entitled to
collect for water in excess of 325,000 gallons.
93.75 cents per 1000 gallons
reasonable.

We find that

($1.25 reduced by 25 percent) is

Foothills has disconnected five homeowners apparent-

ly for failing to pay for water in excess of 325,000 gallons.
Since the Stipulation was ambiguous in this regard, it is not
unreasonable to require Foothills to reconnect the disconnected
users (without charging any disconnect or reconnect fees) upon
payment of the amounts due for excess water.

Applicant also

raised questions about the rates to be charged prior to February
1982.

We

find

no ambiguity

in the

Stipulation

as to those

amounts.
6.

Representatives of the Homeowners1 Association read

the meters on July
Stipulation
stipulated

should
that

established

28, 1985 and the rates set forth in the
be

applicable

effective

in paragraph

July

to that
28,

4, supra,

1985,
should

date.

The

the

interim

take

parties

effect.

rates
Any

homeowner who has paid $100.00 into the escrow account described
in Paragraph 2 of the Stipulation should receive a credit against
any amounts owing.
7.

The Homeowners' Association

filed a Petition to

Amend certain Findings of Fact in the Interim Report and Order

CASE NO. 85-2010-01
- 5 issued August 8, 1985.

Any ruling on that Petition is deferred

to the general rate hearing at which time the parties may present
evidence bearing on the ownership of the water system.
8.

We find that there is just cause for believing

Dansie is a indispensable party to this proceeding and that an
Order to Show Cause should issue ordering him to appear before
this Commission on Mondayf the 16th day of September y 1985, at
10:00 a.m., and show cause why he should not be made a party to
this proceeding.
9.

We find that the Applicant has not yet established

an account with Utah Power and Light Company

in the name of

Foothills Water Company, Inc. and that it is reasonable to expect
it to do on or before Tuesday, September 3, 1985.
10.

Applicant has not filed with the Commission a legal

description of its service area.

It is reasonable to expect

Applicant to file the legal description on or before September 6,
1985.
11.

The parties agreed that a copy of the executed

Stipulation could be filed hereafter and entered into evidence as
Exhibit 8 and it is so received.
12.

We find that it would be in the public interest for

the Applicant to approach the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy
District about the possibility of its making available

(for a

fee) an employee to manage and operate the Foothills system until
such time as the system may be acquired by the District.

It is
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September 13, 1985.
13.

The Homeowners' Association has not tendered to

Foothills all of the funds collected pursuant to the Stipulation
and it is reasonable to expect those funds to be tendered on or
before August 29, 1985 together, with an up-to-date accounting
therefor.
14.

It

is reasonable

for Foothills

to provide

the

Division and Homeowners1 Association with a monthly accounting of
Applicant's disbursements during the interim period.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Applicant should be allowed to file interim rates,

charges and regulations.

The rates and charges should be $27.50

per month for the first 500.0 gallons and $1.50 per 1000 gallons
thereafter with a standby fee of $10.00 per month for those lot
owners not presently connected.
cant

during

the

interim

All amounts collected by Appli-

period

are

subject

to

refund

after

permanent rates are established.
2.

Paragraph 7 of the Stipulation is ambiguous as to

the cost for water used in excess of 325,000 gallons.
93.75 cents per 1000 gallons
reasonable.

A fee of

in excess of 325,000 gallons is

Inasmuch as the Stipulation was ambiguous in this

regard, it is reasonable to require Foothills to reconnect any
users without charging

any disconnect or reconnect

receipt of payments for the excess water.

fees upon

The Stipulation is not

ambiguous as to amounts due prior to February, 1982.
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The rates set forth in the Stipulation should be

effective until July 28, 1985.

Although the Commission does not

ordinarily make rates retroactively, since the Parties so stipulated, we conclude that the interim rates should become effective July 28, 1985,

Homeowners who have paid $100.00 into the

escrow account described in paragraph 2 of the Stipulation should
receive a credit against any amounts owing.
4.

The issues of rate base, depreciation, return on

equity and ownership of the system are in dispute and should be
reserved for the final hearing.
5.

Section 54-2-1 (35) (c) , Utah Code Ann. (1953), as

amended, states:
(c) If any person or corporation performs
any service for or delivers any commodity to
any public utility as defined in this section, that person or corporation is considered to be a public utility and is subject
to the jurisdiction and regulation of the
commission and to this title...
Jesse H. Dansie appears to be a necessary party to this proceeding and he should be ordered to appear before this Commission and
show cause why he should not be made a party.
6.

Applicant

should

be

required

to

establish

an

account with Utah Power and Light on or before September 3, 1985
and

to file with

the Commission

a legal description

service area on or before September 6, 1985.

of its

During the interim

period, Applicant should be required to provide the Division and
Homeowners1 Association with a monthly
ments.

statement of disburse-

On or before August 29, 1985, the Homeowners' Association
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accounting therefor,
7.

Applicant should be required to approach the Salt

Lake County Water Conservancy District prior to September 13,
1985 about the possibility of its making an employee available to
manage and operate Foothills' system.
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That Applicant be
permitted to file on an interim basis rates, charges, and regulations for service.

The rates and charges during the interim

period, which shall be effective retroactively to July 28, 1985,
are a minimum service rate of $27.50 per month for the first 5000
gallons and $1.50 per 1000 gallons thereafter with a standby fee
of $10.00 per month for those lot owners not presently connected.
All amounts collected by Applicant during the interim period are
subject to refund at the time permanent rates are established.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That for the period February,
1982 through July 28, 1985, water in excess of 325,000 gallons
per year be billed and paid for at the rate of 93.75 cents per
1000 gallons.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That Jesse H. Dansie appear
before this Commission

on Monday, the 16th day of September,

1985, at 10:00 a.m. , and show cause why he should not be made a
party to this proceeding.
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depreciation, return on equity and ownership of the water system
be reserved for final hearing.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That Applicant:

establish an

account with Utah Power and Light on or before September 3, 1985;
file with the Commission a legal description of its service area
on or before September 6, 1985? approach the Salt Lake County
Water Conservancy District prior to September 13, 1985 about the
possibility of its making an employee available to manage and
operate Foothills1 system; and provide the Division and Homeowners' Association with a monthly statement of disbursements during
the interim period.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the Homeowners' Association
tender to Foothills, on or before August 19, 1985, any amounts
collected pursuant to the Stipulation together with an up-to-date
accounting therefor.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That this matter be continued to
October 7, 8 and 9, 1985 (the parties should also reserve October
10) at which time evidence shall be offered and received en
permanent rates.

All requests by any party for documents or

information shall be made on or before September 6, 1985 and
responded to no later than September 20, 1985.

The parties shall

exchange witness lists no later than September 27, 1985.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That this Order shall be effective August 28, 1985.
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/s/ Kent Walgren
Administrative Law Judge
Approved and confirmed this 6th day of September, 19 85,
as the Report and Order of the Commission.
I si Brent H. Cameron, Chairman
(SEAL)

I si James M. Byrne, Commissioner
I si Brian T, Stewart, Commissioner

Attest:
I si Georgia B. Peterson, Secretary

EXHIBIT B

- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In the Matter o£ the Application)
Of FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY, INC.)
for a Certificate o x Convenience)
and Necessity to Operate as a
)
Public Utilitv.
)

CASE NO, 35-2010-01
REPORT AND ORDER

ISSUED; March l*7, 19 3 6
Appearances:
Brian W. Burnett
For
Assistant Attorney General

w

Val R. Antczak

Stephen R. Randle

division of Public Utilities
Department of Business
Regulation, State c r Utah,
Intervenor
Foothills Water Company,
Inc. ,
Applicant

"

Hi-Country Estates Home
Owners1 Association,
Protestant

By the Commission:
Pursuant to notice duly served, this matter came on for
general rate hearing on January 2?, ?3, ~IA, ln

and 29, 19S5,

before Kent Walgren, Administrative Law Judge for the Utah Public
Service Commission.

Applicant, Foothills Water Company, Inc.

("Foothills") filed its original Application on June 1, 1995.
Hearings were held on July 3f 19S5 and July 23, 1985, at which
time some evidence was offered and received.

On August 8, 19 85

the Commission entered its Order granting Applicant a Certificate
of Convenience and Necessity and sanctioning interim rates in
accordance with

a stipulation

between

homeowners of Hi-Country Estates.
filed

its Amended

Application,

the Applicant

and the

On August 15, 1985. Applicant
praying

that

the

Commission
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approve a basic water rate of $152.00 per month per customer,
plus an additional
month.

amount

for usage over

2"?,0CC gallons per

On August 28, 1985 additional evidence was offered and

received, on

the basis

of which

the Commission

(see

Second

Interim Report and Order issued September 6, 1985) set interim
rates (subject to refund) of $27.50 per month for the first 5,000
gallons and $1.50 per 1,000 gallons over 5,000 and a standby fee
of $10.00 per month

for lot owners unconnected

to the water

system.
In its September 6, 1985 Report and Order the Commission, having concluded that it may not be able to set just and
reasonable
Dansie, the

rates

without

supplier

asserting

(pursuant

jurisdiction

to a lease) of

over

Jesse

the water to

Hi-Country Estates, ordered Mr. Dansie to appear on September 16,
1985 and £how cause why he should not be made a party to this
proceeding.

On account of ever mounting legal fees and represen-

tations by counsel that negotiations for the sale of the water
company were underway that might remove the Commission's jurisdiction, a final ruling on that issue was deferred.

Although a

sale of Foothills1 shares to Rod Dansie, son o* Jesse Dansie, was
consummated,

Commission

Jurisdiction

was

rot

affected.

On

January ?1, 1986, 'just prior to the general rate hearing, the
parties, having apparently concluded that the Commission could
set just and reasonable rates without asserting personal jurisdiction over Jesse Dansie, moved that the show cause be quashed
which motion the Administrative Law Judge took under advisement.
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The Administrative Law Judge, having been fully advised
in the premises, now makes and enters the following recommended
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Report and Order based
thereon:
FINDINGS OF FACm
1.

Applicant is a corporation organized and existing

under the laws of the state of Utah; Applicant was incorporated
in June, 1985.

On August 8, 1985 Applicant was granted Certifi-

cate of Convenience and Necessity No. 2151 and interim rates were
set by this Commission.

The interim rates were modified by the

Commission's Second Interim Report and Order issued September 6,
1985.
2.

Protestant, Hi-Country Estates Home Owners' Asso-

ciation ("Homeowners") is a Utah non-profit corporation consisting of the homeowners of Hi-Country Estates subdivision, Phase I,
located a few miles southwest of Herriman, Salt Lake County,
Utah.
3.

Applicant

is

a water

corporation, proposing

to

provide culinary water to a residential area in the southwest
corner of Salt Lake County.

Applicant's proposed service area

(see Exhibit 16) includes all of the Hi-Country Estates subdivision, Phase

I, plus

three areas

(approximately

one-sixteenth

section each) along the western border of the platted subdivision
and referred to as the "Tank 2 area", the "South Oquirrh area"
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The proposed service

area differs slightly from that approved by the Commission when
Applicant was granted its certificate.
4.

Applicant's

service

area

customers and 54 standby customers.

consists

of

63

active

In addition, the well and

facilities which supply water to Applicant also supply water to
thirteen (13) hook-ups outside the service area to the southeast,
referred to hereafter as the "Dansie hook-ups11 or "Dansie properties."
5.

Applicant's ownership of water company assets is

contested by the Homeowners and is the subject of a lawsuit
currently pending in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County (Civil No. C85-6748) .
6.

Hi-Country Estates subdivision, Phase I ("Subdivi-

sion") , was initially

developed

partnership

of

("Bagley"),

consisting
Charles

in about

general

Lewton

1970 by

partners

("Lewton")

and

a

Gerald

H. Bagley

Harold

/"Glazier") and a few additional limited partners.

limited

Glazier

Subdivision

Public Report #3?5, issued by the Real Estate Division of the
Utah Department of Business Regulation on June S, 1970 (Exhibit
69), states that as of that date the plat had not been recorded.
The Public Report, which was to be delivered to prospective lot
purchasers, also states:
WAT^R: Water will be supplied by the Salt
Lake County Water Conservancy District...
Costs of installation to be borne by subdivides
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The Report further notes tha*-. the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District ("Conservancy District") has not yet annexed the
property and that before it does certain facilities will have to
be constructed.
"7.

On August 16 f 1970, a limited partnership consist-

ing of Bagley, Lewton and Glazier, entered

into an agreement

(Exhibit 42) with -Jesse Dansie and his wife, Ruth, pursuant to
which the Dansies leased to the partnership a well and wa^er
rights

(evidenced by Certificate ^821°, application *26451 ^ to

1.19 cfs

(cubic feet per second* .

The water was to be used by

the partnership to supply water to its "subdivision(s) developed
and being developed in the area..."

The term of the lease was

five (5) years, during which time the partnership was to pay the
Dansies $300 per month, or a total of 218,000.

In addition, the

partnership was to maintain the well, provide the Dansies one (1*
connection at actual cost and the Dansies were to be allowed to
use the water at any time it was not being used by the developers, for which the Dansies were to pay the costs of pumping.

The

partnership also had an option to extend the lease an additional
five (5) years for $600 per month.

The well referred to in this

lease can produce approximately 480 gallons per minute and is
located a few hundred feet north of the subdivision boundary on
property owned by Jesse Dansie.

It is referred to hereafter as

"Well No. 1".
8.

In March, 1971, Bush & Gudgell, registered profes-

sional engineers, prepared specifications for the construction of
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the following month the Conservancy District was formally petitioned

(but apparently never acted affirmatively) to annex the

Subdivision.

In or about 1972, the Subdivision plat was approved

and recorded and construction began on seme homes.
9.

On April

1,

1974

(the photocopy

of Exhibit

50

appears to read 1971, but the last page of Exhibit "A" of Exhibit
51 gives the date April 1, 1974) a renewable five-year lease was
executed between Hi-Ccuntry Estates (a corporation and a general
partner of the developer partnership) and Roy Glazier, the owner
of Let 51, for the lease of an existing deep well

(hereafter

"Glazier Well11) which would provide water for the Subdivision.
The terms were $300 per month ror the first five years and $400
per month for the next five years.

In addition, Glazier would be

permitted to withdraw seven (7) gallons per minute from April 1
to October 1 at no cost, the lessee being required to pay the
pumping costs and maintenance.

A letter from the Utah State

Department of Health to Hi-Country Estates, dated June 3, 19"4,
approves the Glazier Well for 72 residential connections, "based
on a supply of 80 gallons per minute... as certified b" Call
Engineering, Inc."
10.

Although Bagley was involved in the initial devel-

opment of the Subdivision, sometime about 1972 he withdrev; from
the limited partnership.

Then, in May of 19^4 he personally

repurchased the development from the developer partnership.
Agreement

(Exhibit 51) memorializes

the sale o* sixteen

The
(16)
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unsold lots, the rights in the Glazier Well lease, the obligations under the Dansie well Agreement and "All rrght, title and
interest in and to the water system and equipment serving HiCountry Estates."
11.
Bagleyf

On April 7, 1977, Jesse Dansie, as lessor, and

as lessee entered

into a "Well Lease and Water Line

Extension Agreement" (hereafter "Well Lease Agreement") for Well
No. 1, the same well upon which the 1970 lease had been executed
(see paragraph

7, supra).

Under

this

ten-year

lease

fwhich

expires in April, 1987), in return for the use of the well and
water therefrom, Bagley agreed to the following:
a.

To pay $5,100 plus $300 per month for the first

five years and $600 per month for the next five years.
b.
tial hook-ups

To provide Jesse Dansie with five free residen-

to members

of his

immediate

family, including

reasonable amounts of culinary and irrigation water, presumably
at no cost.

These hook-ups were for Jesse Dansiefs children who

were building or planning to build homes just east of the Subdivision.
c.

To provide Jesse Dansie with fifty

residential hook-ups.

These would

Bagley, who would pay 50 percent

be

charged water

(50) free
fees by

of any amounts collected to

Jesse Dansie.
d.

That Jesse Dansie be allowed to use any excess

water not being used by Bagley for only the costs of pumping.
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To indemnify and pay Dansiers court costs and

attorney's fees "of any nature whatever" which arise out of the
Well

Lease Agreement.

No

comparable

provision was made

for

Bagley's indemnification or the recovery of his legal fees should
he prevail.
f.

That Jesse Dansie be provided water on these

same terms for as long as the Subdivision water system is in
existence

(even

after

the

expiration

or

termination

of

the

agreement).
In addition, the Well Lease Agreement provided for the
construction of three water line extensions, all to be completed
within one year:
Extension No. 1: From Well No. 1 to the lines of the
existing

Hi-Country

Water

Subdivision boundary).

Company

system

(along

the

north

Jesse Dansie was to dig the trench and

Pagley was to provide pipes and all other materials and easements.

Extension Mo. 1 was to be maintained by Pagley and owned

by Jessee Dansie.

Dansie would also have the right to take water

from any part of the extension to serve his own property.
Extension No. 2: From the most easterly point o r the
Subdivision to the Dansie water line at approximately "200 T-est
and 13300 South (all outside of the Subdivision).

Dansie was to

pay for, maintain and own this extension, but Pagley was to be
permitted to run water from the Subdivision system through this
line, to property he owned approximated three '3) miles east of
the Subdivision, which he hoped to develop to be known as "The
Foothills."
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Extension No. 3^ Dansie was to install, pay for and own
an extension from his own water system at 6800 West and 13000
South extending along 6800 West to 13400 South.

This extension

would terminate at the northwest corner of Section ? (T4Sf R1>D ,
in which Bagley owned the property just referred to.

Bagley was

to maintain this extension during the term of the Agreement.
Subsequently, on July 3, 1935, the 'fell Lease Agreement
was amended to define the "reasonable" amount of water to be
provided

at no cost to the five

(5) Dansie immediate

family

hook-ups as 12,000,000 gallons per year, to provide in addition
free water to Lot 51 of the Subdivision, apparently now owned by
one of the Dansies, and to specify that the pumping fees for any
excess water used by the Dansies be restricted to incremental
pumping power costs, rather than shared power costs for pumping.
12.

In 1980, the Subdivision water company was trans-

ferred from Bagley to another limited partnership, Jordan Acres
("Jordan Acres"), of which Bagley was a general partner.
lf

On June

1985, the day the initial Application was filed with this

Commission, the water company assets were transferred from Jordan
Acres to Foothills, in return for all of Foothills1 outstanding
shares.

On October 31, 1985 all of the stock and assets of

Foothills were transferred from Bagley to Rod Dansie.

Dansie,

who had been watermaster of the Subdivision water system for a
number of years, took control of Foothills in partial satisfaction of $80,447.43 he claimed from Bagley for unpaid bills for
labor and materials furnished to the water svstem.
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Between 1970 and 1981, the residents of the Subdi-

vision were charged $100 per year for water.
Bagley

summarily

raised

In February, 1981,

the yearly water rate to $400.

The

residents balked, tempers flared, and in 1985 Bagley was finally
forced to seek Commission sanction of rates.
14.

From about 1972 until August 3, 1985, when Appli-

cant was granted its Certificate of Convenience and Necessity, it
acted illegally as an uncertificated public utility.

The record

is clear that Bagley and his partners knew from the beginning
that unless they were annexed by the Conservancy District they
would be subject to Commission jurisdiction.
May

27,

1970

(Exhibit

68), rrom

Lewtcn

In a letter, dated
to

the

Conservancy

District, T.ewton notes that "we do not intend to become a water
utility company..."

In the April 7, 1977 Well Lease Agreement

between Bagley and Jesse Dansie, paragraph F.3. states:
3.
Dansie further agrees that Bagley
may apply to the Utah Public Service Commission for such permits or approvals as may be
required and Dansie shall cooperate fully in
all respects as may be required to obtain
such permits or approvals as may be required
by the Public Service Commission.
Bagley
agrees to pay all costs incurred in obtaining
such approval, including, but not limited to,
legal and engineering fees.
Despite Bagleyfs

awareness that he was subject to Commission

jurisdiction, the records of the Commission show no contact by
him orior to June of 1985.
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WELL LEASE AGREEMENT
15.

Of the various problems involved

in setting the

just and reasonable rates mandated by U.C.A. Section 54-3-1, the
Well Lease Agreement described in paragraph 11 above is the most
troublesome.

The Commission finds that it is unreasonable to

expect Foothills to support the entire burden of the Well Lease
Agreement.

This Agreement, insofar as it relates strictly to

benefits received by Foothills (without taking into account the
benefits Bagley may have perceived in view of his future development plans) is grossly unreasonable, requiring not only substantial monthly payments, but also showering virtually limitless
benefits on Jesse Dansie and the members of his immediate family.
There is some evidence on the record to indicate that both Bagley
and Jesse Dansie had future development plans in mind (perhaps
even in'some form of partnership) and that the Well Lease Agreement was entered into on both sides primarily with that in mind
and only secondarily to provide water to the residents of the
Subdivision.

We find that the Division's estimate of the actual

value of the Well Lease of $368 per month or $4,416 per year
(Exhibit 58), is reasonably accurate.
Yet the benefits which Jesse Dansie stands to receive,
in addition to the $600 monthly lease payments, are substantial:

($750 x 5 ) .

a.

50 free hook-ups. Value: $37,500 ($750 x 50).

b.

Five free residential hook-ups. Value: $3,750
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12,000,000 gallons of free water per year.

(We

note that this is nearly as much as the entire projected yearly
consumption

by

the

63 active

customers

of

the

Subdivision.)

Using Applicant's figures for annual power costs to Foothills
customers for the main pump only ($11,497.84 (see Exhibit 53),
plus

incremental

pumping

costs

for the additional

12,000,000

gallons (S2,540.95 see Exhibit 85, p. 3 ) , the total cost of power
is $14,03S."79* per year, of which 44 percent (see Exhibit 62 —
Allocation Factor Based on Usage), or S6 ,lnn
to the Dansies.
Dansies of %lnS

.0*7, is attributable

When the chemical costs attributable to the
are added

(see Exhibit 85, p. 3 ) , the total

estimated value o* the free water is 56,353.06 per year.
Since

the Well

T

iease Agreement

purports

to

require

Bagley to provide water on these same terms "for such time beyond
the expiration or termination

of this Agreement

as water

is

supplied to any of the Hi-Country properties or that the lines
and water

system referred

to in this Agreement

are

in exis-

tence...ff, if one assumes, for example, that the system installed
in 1972 has a 40-year useful life (see Exhibit 24) and that the
costs of power and chemicals remain the same, the potential value
of the 1^,000,000 gallons of free water alone from 19nn,

the year

* The July 3, 19S* Amendment to the Well Lease Agreement (Exhibit
10) which defines the "reasonable" free wa^er f or the Dansies as
1?,000,000 gallons and specifies that the power costs for excess
water shall be figured incrementally rather than proportionately
lacks meaningful consideration and is, to the extent relevant to
our inquiry, 4 nvalid..
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the lease was executed, to the year 2012, is $222,357.36.

While

no one can blame Mr, Dansie for desiring to provide free water to
his children

in virtual perpetuity, this Commission would be

abrogating its statutory duty were it to impose such a burden en
Foothills1 present and future customers.
d.

Although it is difficult to arrive at precise

dollar values for the rights to the excess water and for the
indemnification rights and rights to legal fees, it is undeniable
that these have some value.
Thus,

the total potential

liability

Lease Agreement is in excess of $263,607.

under

the Well

We find that it would

be unjust and unreasonable to expect Foothills' 63 active customers to support the entire burden of the Well Lease Agreement.
We further find that payment of the $600 monthly Lease payment by
Foothills will adequately cover the value of the benefit Foothills is receiving under the Lease and that the remaining burdens
of the Lease should be Bagley's personal obligation.

Paragraph

F.2. of the Well Lease Agreement makes Bagley personally responsible to fulfill the terms and conditions of the Lease, whether
or not a water company is created to which Bagley conveys or
assigns the Well Lease Agreement.

Under paragraph F.3. of the

Lease, Jesse Dansie agrees that Bagley may apply to the Public
Service Commission for a certificate and Dansie agrees to "cooperate fully in all respects as may be required to obtain such
permits or approvals as may be required by the Public Service
Commission."

As

part

of Mr. Dansie's

cooperation

with

the
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for the $600 monthly lease payment and to Bagley personally for
any remaining obligations under the Well Lease Agreement.
At the hearing, Rod Dansie offered some testimony as to
his father's intentions with respect to the Well Lease Agreement
in the event the Commission were to require the Dansies to pay
for the water obtained from Well No. 1.

He indicated that the

Dansies own numerous other v/ells and water rights in the area and
that they would likely disconnect themselves from the Foothills
system and obtain their water elsewhere.
It is, of course, up to Jesse Dansie where he procures
his

water.

The

Commission

has

no

objection

to

the

Dansies

continuing to obtain their water from Well >?o. 1, provided the
actual pro-rata (not incremental) costs

r

or power, chlorination

and water testing involved in delivering that water are paid for
by someone other than the customers in Applicant's service area.
We find that it is reasonable ror Foothills to bill "''esse Dansie
for the actual cost of any water provided to hin, his family or
his other connections, and ^or Mr. Dan?>ie to seek reimbursement
for s=me from Bagley.
RATE BASE
16.

The amount of rate base to be allowed the Applicant

is contested.

Applicant (P.ev. Exhibit 23) claims a rate base o^

$14?,200.56, the capital expenses for improvements acquired since
19 75

that

remain

used

and

useful.

The

Division

recommends

f"1,05°. ^3, the cost of the six-inch meter installed in December,
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1985 to measure the amount of water being consumed by the Dansies.
The Division claims that since there is a dispute as to the
ownership of Foothills assets, no additional rate base should be
allowed {see Exhibits 12, 40 and f>n) .

The Homeowners, claiming

ownership of all assets of the water system, argue that Applicant's rate base should be zero.
17.

We find that all improvements to Foothills prior to

1981 are not includeable in rate base because:
a.

Bagley was selling lots at a profit until 19"6

(see Exhibit 25^ .
b.

The improvements made between

1977 and

1930

were to have been provided by Bagley as part of the original
system.

For

improvements

made

from

1981-1985, we

find

as

follows:
1981:

The pressure valve by lot #16 and the new air

and vacuum valve and check valve on booster station are allowable
in rate base (see Rev. Exhibit 23). Total allowed: $2,611.93.
1982:

The new controls for tank #2 and new relay en

booster station are allowable in rate base (see Rev. Exhibit 23).
Total allowed: $1,116.47.
1983:

No costs allowable for rate base.

The 75 H.P.

motor becomes Jesse Dansie's property by the terms of the Well
Lease Agreement.

Insofar as the replacement of the 600-foot

section of main is concerned, we find that Applicant failed tc
demonstrate that the costs involved in making that repair were
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ownership of the main.

In addition, Bagley would have been

responsible to assure that the main was in good condition before
the system would have been accepted by the Conservancy District.
d.

19 84: No improvements.

e.

1985: The

replacement

of

booster

pump,

starter

control panel, new tank overflow control valves, six-inch metering station and li-inch metering station are allowable in rate
base.

The check valve for the deep well is not allowable because

it becomes Jesse Dansie's property by the terms of the Well ^ease
Agreement.

Total allowed: $13,606.59.

Thus,

Applicant's

total

allowable

rate

base

is

$16,334.99.
RATE OF RETURN
13.

The parties stipulated, and the Commission finds,

that 12 percent is a reasonable rate of return.
EXPENSES
19.

The Commission notes that Bagley's management of

Foothills and its predecessors has been less than commendable and
finds there is cause for concluding the utility will be more
competently managed in the future.

Given the expected improve-

ments, and ambiguities in the costs of providing service in the
past, the Division's projected test year ending December 31, 1036
seems

reasonable.

U.C.A.

Section

54-4-4(3^, however,

limits

future test periods to 12 months from the date of filing (amended
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filing date: August 16, 1985); we will thus have to adopt a test
year ending December 31, 1985
attritional

adjustments

to

(see

Rev. Exhibit 20) and make

reflect

future

conditions.

The

Homeowners generally supported the Division's recommendations in
this area.
a.

Accounting

and

Administrative:

Applicant

is

requesting 510,200; the Division and Homeowners recommend $3,006.
Applicant intends to hire an accountant at ?18.00 per hour; the
Division contends that a computer accounting service is adequate.
Applicant's figure includes the cost of office rental and S1~0$200 per month for a secretary.

The Division's witness testified

that Rod Dansie should run the water company out of his home at
no charge to the users.

We find that the Division's and Appli-

cant's figure of $3,000 is reasonable, with the following adjustments:
(i)

Applicant is entitled to be reimbursed for

the reasonable costs of office space (either in Rod Dansie?s home
or elsewhere) sufficient to hold a desk, file cabinet and telephone.

We find that $50 per month ($600 per year) is reasonable.
(ii)

The Division

assumed

that the time re-

quired to read meters would be two hours per month; Rod Dansie
testified it takes four—five hours. We find that four hours per
month for meter reading is reasonable and that $17.20 per hour
(the hourly wage paid to Conservancy District employees) is more
reasonable than the $20 per hour proposed by Applicant.

We thus
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or $412.80 per year.
b.

Total allowed: $4,012.80.

Insurance: The parties

agreed, and we

find,

that $2,500 per year is reasonable.
c.

Water lease payment: $7,200 (see paragraph 15,

d.

Utilities:

supra).

Main Pump.

Our allowed expenses in this category are based

upon the following assumptions:
(i)

The

Dansies

will

obtain

their

water

elsewhere (if they elect to receive it from Well -1, since the
water company will collect their pro rata pumping costs, the
power

costs

for the utility will be

reduced, . gi-ren

slightly

UP&Vs rate structure).
(ii)

The

customers

will

use

a

total

of

13,000,000 gallons during 1986, of which five percent will be
lost to leakage or theft.
fiii)

The main pump delivers

260 gallons per

minute.
(iv)

The kilowatt demand o^ the pump is 6^kW

(see Exhibit 21) .
(v)
low-use months

For

every

gallon of water used

in the

(January-May, October-December) 4.54 gallons o*

water are used during the high-use months (June-September) (see
Exhibit 53) .
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(vi>

For two of the high use months, because of

breaks or fires, the main pump will operate on Schedule 6, rather
than Schedule 3.
(vii)

Electric Service Schedule 35, the Monthly

Energy Charge Adjustment which is incorporated into both Schedules 3 and 6 (of which we take official notice and which will
result

in

a

relatively

small

adjustment

upward)

imposes

an

additional charge of $.00406 per kWh.
Thus, an average of 4R9,458 galleys per month will be
pumped during the lew-use months and 2,?71,0R4 gallons per mrnth
during the high-use months, requiring the pump to operate 21.4
hours

during

the

low-use months

and

145.6

hours

during

the

high-use months.
Under UP&Lfs Schedule No. 3, we calculate the monthly
bills as follows:
(i)

Low-Use

Months: Customer

Service

Charge

($55.39), plus Demand Charge (66 JcW x S3.^5 per kT^7 = $:4",.50)#
plus Energv Charge
Charge Adjustment

(2072 kWh x $.0408"7 = $?4.68) plus Energy
(2072 kWh x $.00406 = $8.41).

Total monthly

charge: $395.98.
(ii)

High-Use Months:
(a) Schedule

3: Customer Service Charge

($55.39), plus Demand Charge (66 kW x $3.75 per kW = $?4"7.50),
plus Energy Charge

(9610 kWh x $.04087 = $392.76) plus Energy

Charge Adjustment (9610 kWh x $.00406 * $39.02).
charge: $734.67.

Total monthly
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Service Charge

($28.66), plus Demand Charge ([66 kW minus 5 kW] x $9.18 per kW =
$559.98), plus Energv Charge ([500 kWh x .131755 = $65.38] plus
[9110 kWh x .058169 = $529.92] = $595.80), plus Energy Charge
Adjustment (9610 kWh x $.00406 = $39.02).

Total monthly charge:

$1,223.46.
Total for eight low-use months: 8 months x $395.93 =
$3,167.84; total

for two high-use months on Schedule

3: 2 x

$734.67 = $1,469.34; total for two high-use months on Schedule 6:
2 x $1,223.46 = $2,446.92.
Total allowed for main pump: $7,084.10.
Booster Pump: Our allowed expenses in this category are
based upon the following assumptions:
(i)

Kilowatt demand

of the booster

pump is

23 kW (see Exhibit 41) .
(ii)

Homeowner demand will drop from 17,000,000

gallons in 1985 to 13,000,000 gallons in 19?6 (76.5 percent of
1935).
(iii>

Since the booster pump consumed 33,038 kr«\h

in 1985, it will consume approximately 29,126 kWh in 19 86.
(iv)

For e^ery

gallon

of

water

used

in the

low-use months, 4.64 gallons of water are used during the highuse months; thus, the booster pump will use 1097 kWh per month in
low-use months and 5088 kWh per month in high-use months.
(v)

For

two

of

the

four

high-use

months,

because of fires or other emergencies, two booster pumps will be
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required, resulting

in a change

from

small

customer

to large

customer status.
Using UP&L's Schedule No. 6, we calculate the monthly
bills as follows:
(i)

Low-Use

(54.05) , plus Demand Charge

Months?

Customer

Service

Charge

(18 kW x 26.45 per kw = $116.10),

plus Energy Charge ([500 kWh x $. 092602 = $46. 301 plus [59"> kT*h x
$.040887 = $24.41] = $70.71), plus Energy Charge Adjustment (1C9~
kwh x S.00406 = $4.45).
(ii)

Total monthly charge: S195.31.
High-Use Months:
(a)

Charge
([500

Small

(S4.05), plus Demand Charge
kWh x

$.092602

=

$46.30]

customers: Customer

(116.10), plus Energy Charge

plus

[4588

kT*:h x

$187.59] = $233.89) plus Energy Charge Adjustment
$.00406^= $20.66).

$.04089"?

=

(^038 k*:h x

Total monthly charge: $374.70.
(b)

Charge

Service

($28.66), plus

Demand

Large

customers: Customer

Charge

Service

(18 kW x $9.18 per kT.v =

$165.24), plus Energy Charge ([500 kWh x $.131'755 = $65,881 plus
[4588 kWh x $.058169
Adjustment

= $266.88] = $33°.76), plus Energy Charge

(5088 kWh x $.00406 = $20.66).

Total monthly charge:

$54-\32.
Total for eight low-use months: 8 monthr x $195.31 =
$1,562.48; total

for two high-use

small

customer months:

2 x

$374.70 « $ 7 49.40; total for two high use large customer months:
2 x $547.32 * $1,094.64.
Total allowed for booster pump: $3,406.52.
TT-M i «,• 4-«ioc fotai for both Dumps: $10 r 490.62.
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Telephone: $600.00 per year.

f.

Directors1

Fees:

$600.00

per

year,

of

which $300 per year is allocated for directors' insurance.
g.

Legal

Expenses: $3,000.

Although

there

was some evidence offered indicating that Applicant's legal fees
may exceed $10,000, we find that the majority of these fees would
not have been incurred
1972.
is

if Foothills had been certificated in

We thus accept the Division's recommendation that $3,000

reasonable

granted).

(the

Homeowners

recommended

no

legal

fees

be

Vie further find that this amount should be capitalized

over three years and thus allow $1,000 for 1986.
h.

Repairs and Maintenance: In this category,

the Division recommends $21,600 and the Applicant 222,872.
Homeowners sponsored no exhibit in this area.

The

The Division's

figure is based on the reasonable cost of repairs and maintenance
for other water utilities of approximately the same sine; Applicant's figure is based upon Foothills' average cost of repairs
and maintenance for the past fr.ur years.

We find that Appli-

cant's method, which uses past data of the utility under consideration, is mostly likely to yield accurate figures for 1986. Tve
find further that the $2°, 8"? 2 figure should be reducer1 by the
difference between the $20 per hnur paid during 1985 for repairs
and maintenance and the SI"7.20 per hour we are allowing for 1986.
Since

620 hours were billed

for repair

and maintenance

from

December 1, 1984 through November 30, 198=; (see Exhibit 56), the
difference between the hourly rates ($2.30 per hour x 620 hours),
*l,n2S,

should be deducted.

Total al\cwed: 521,136.
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Applicant submitted proposed capital expenditures for
1986 totalling $16,094

(see Exhibits 32, 33, and 34).

[These

proposed expenditures are accounted ^or in lines 3, 4, and 3 cf
(division) Exhibit 5n.

The Division recommended that Nos. 1, 3,

4, 5 and 6 of Exhibit 57 be allowed, but reduced as follows: Mc.
1: $2,000; No. 3: $1,900; No. 4: $3,234.21; No. 5: $1,000; No. 6:
$1,000.

Total: $9,100.

Jon Strawn, a Division witness, testi-

fied that the total $9,100 could be paid for out cf the Division's recommended $21,600 Repair and Maintenance expense.1

\<e

note that in order to qualify for the reduced power rates allowed
by the Commission, Applicant will incur some costs to set up the
deep well pump for Schedule 3 operation.
costs

Since some capital

(labor and perhaps materials also) have apparently been

included in the past Repair and Maintenance figures (upon which
we have based 1986 allowed expenses in this category), Applicant
should be able to set up the deep well pump for Schedule 3
operation

without

exceeding

Repairs and Maintenance.

the

amount

we

have

allowed

for

Proposed capital improvements are not

Repair and Maintenance expenses.

If allowed (the Commission will

be disinclined to allow capital expenditures for which Applicant
does not obtain competing bids) they are to be included in rate
base at some future date.
i.

Chemicals: We find that the $400 per year

recommended by the Division is reasonable.
j.

Water Testing: We find that the $1,200 per

year recommended by the Division is reasonable.
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k.

Uncollectible Accounts; We find that the

$4,200 per year recommended by the Division is reasonable.

This

figure assumes collection of only 50 percent of standby fees.
1.

Property Taxes: Title to the real property

claimed by the utility is contested.

Since the property valua-

tion and tax notices are sent to the Homeowners (see Exhibit 40),
who have historically paid these taxes and have agreed to continue paying them, we allow Applicant no expense in this category.

At such time as a court of competent jurisdiction may

quiet title to the real property in the Applicant, a reasonable
expense in this category will be allowed.
m.

Deoreciation:

We

find

it

reasonable

to

—

allow depreciation only on assets included
paragraph 17, supra).

in rate base

(see

Using Applicant's (P.evised Exhibit 24) and

the Division's (Exhibit 83) depreciation schedules, we allow the
following:
(i)

1°31

assets:

52,622.93

(ii)

1982

assets:

$1,116.47

x

5%

=

5131.15
x

10% =

5111.65
(iii)

1983 assets: none.

(iv)

^934 assets: none.

(v)

1985 assets:
(a) Booster pump: $2,^35.35 x 20% =

f -• *±

.
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(b)

Starter

control

panel:

overflow

control

l*-inch metering

station:

$2,128.16 x 10% = $212.82.
(c)
valves, 6-inch metering

station

$7,743.08 x 5% = $38"?.15.
n.

New
and

tank

Total depreciation: $1,339.77.

Regulatory Fee: The Division

recommended,

and we find, that S150 per year is reasonable.
Thus,

Applicant's

total

allowed

expenses

are

554,379.19. [Applicant also claimed an interest expense of 24 ,6 20
(see

Second

Revised

Exhibit

22).

This

is

a

belnw-the-line

expense and not allowed.!
TAXES
20.

The return to which Applicant is entitled is equal

to rate base times rate of return, or $16,334.99 x .17 = $1,960.
The taxes on this amount are as follows:
a.

Utah

State

Corporate

Franchise

Tax

f~iT-e

percent or $100 minimum): J 1 00.
b.

Federal Tncome Tax (15 percent): $294.

Total taxes allowed: S394.00
TOTAL AMOUNT TO BE GENERATED PY PATES
21.

The total amount needed to be generated by rates:

Expenses: $54,879.19; Return: $1,960.20; Taxes: J3°4.00.
$57,^33.39.

Total
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22.

Standby Fees:

In both the Timber Lakes Water case

and the Silver Springs Water case (M C S. 82-076-01 and 85-570-01,
respectively), the Commission found that S9.00 per month was a
reasonable standby .^ee. We find that $9.0 0 per month is also a
reasonable standby for Foothills1 customers.
fee was set at SIO.OO per month

Since the standby

in the Commission's

Interim

Order, Applicant shall credit $1.00 per mon^h to standby customers who have paid the $10.00 amount during the interim period.
The standby charges will thus generate

$9.00 per month x 12

months x 54 customers = $5,8 32.

23.

Other Charges: We find that the following charges

are reasonable:

set

forth

in

a.

Connection Fee: S750.00.

b.

Turn-On Service: $50.00.

c.

Account Transfer Charge: $25.00

d.

Reconnection Fee: $50.00.

e.

Service Deposit: $100.00 (under the conditions

Exhibit

30} .

These

charges

should

generate

the

following income during 1986: Connection Fees: One at $750.00;
Reconnection and Turn-on Fees: $200,00.
24.

Water

Sales:

According

Total revenues: $950.00.
to

the

best

available

records, the Homeowners consumed approximately 16,000,000 gallons
of water during 1985 (see Exhibit 59) *

The Division estimates
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that the Homeowners will consume the same amount of water in 19 86
(see Exhibits 61 and 63). Applicant estimates that the Homeowners will consume 12,358,00G gallons during 1986

{Exhibit 35).

Although no price elasticity analysis was performed, the Commission is aware that as the price for a commodity increases the
demand for that commodity is likely to fall.

We find it probable

that the increased costs of water will result in reduced consumption by the Homeowners and find that approximately
gallons will be consumed during 1986.

13,000,000

The sale of the 13,000,000

gallons must generate $50,451.39.
RATE STRUCTURE
25.

T

.n its Second Interim Order, the Commission estab-

lished a demand/commodity rate structure in which all customers
paid

$2"7.50 for the first 5,000 gallons and SI.50 per

gallons thereafter.

In the rate hearing, the Division recommend-

ed that the first block be increased to 10,000 gallons
Exhibit 63).

1,000

(see

Norman Sims, President of the Homeowners' Asso-

ciation, however, testified that the 10,000 block was too large
and recommended the 5,000 minimum be retained.

T

,Ce find that the

5,000 minimum is reasonable and will tend to encourage conservation.

We find also that both the demand and commodity charges

will have to be increased over the interim rates in order to
generate the required $50,451,39 and find that a rate of S3". 50
for the first 5,000 gallons and $2.40 for every 1,000 gaMor.s
thereafter is reasonable and will generate $50,480.40.
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its policy with

respect to capital expenditures to be included in rate base:
...it is the policy of the Commission to
allow no return on investment by water
companies unless such companies can meet the
burden of showing that the investment made
was not recovered in the sale of lots or in
any other fashion.
Dammeron Valley Water
Company (Case No. 84-061-01, issued Januarv
17, 1985 at p.7).
It is the generally accepted rule that contributions in aid of
construction should be excluded from rate base (see citations at
PUR3d, Valuation, Sections 248, 250). Where a developer fails to
demonstrate that an investment in a water utility was not recovered in the sale of lots, that investment is deemed to be a
contribution
base.

in aid of construction

and excludable

from rate

In a 1981 case, the Maryland Public Service Commission

held:
In determining the rate base of a water and
sewer company that offered service only to a
real estate developer and whose stock was
solely owned by the real estate developer,
the commission found that the real estate
developer had recovered through the sale of
the development's lots substantially most of
his investment in the sewer company; furthermore, to say that the investor had recovered
via the sale of lots substantially most of
the investment in plant was analogous to
finding that customers had made significant
contributions in aid of construction, and
that such payments were' customer-supplied
capital. Re Crestview Services, Inc., 72 Md
PSC 129, Case No. 7474, Order No. 65118, Feb.
5, 1981.
See also Re Northern Illinois Water Corp. (1959) 26 PUR3d 49"; Re
Green-Fields Water Co. (1964) 53 PUR3d 670; North Carolina ex
Y-oi _ utilities Commission v. Heater Utilities, Inc. (1975> ?9S :-!C
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And in cases where the weight of the evidence indicates
the developer knew it was subject to Commission jurisdiction and
neglected or refused to seek Commission sanction of rates, that
burden to justify rates by substantial evidence "rests heavily"
indeed.

An

uncertificated

public

utility

which

enters

into

unreasonable contracts, or makes expenditures which the Commission has no opportunity to review, does so at the risk o^ not
being able to recover those expenses in rates.

Before allowing

the recovery of such expenses, the utility must clearly demonstrate by substantial evidence that the obligations and expenditures arc reasonable and justified.
This policy

applies whether

or not utility

company

assets have been transferred from one legal entity to another,
even in arm's length transactions in which there is no imputation
of

impropriety, when

to do otherwise would

ratepayers or defeat regulatory policy.

penalize

utility

See Colorado Interstate

Gas Company v. Federal Power Commission, 224 US 5S1, 58 PVR(MS)
65, 82-83

(1945); Cities Service Gas Company v. Federal Power

Commission, 424 F.2d 411, 8"? PUR3d fO (10th Cir. ^.969> ; Tennessee
Public Service Commission v. Nashville Gas Co., 551 S*72d 315, 10
PUR4th 66 (Tenn. 1977); Re H^L Utilities, Inc., 53 PUR4th 508
(PSC^nd. 1983); Re Southern California Lumber Transport, 26 PUR3d
291 (CalPUC 1958); Re John R. Peryatel, et al., dba Northern Mew
Mexico Gas Company, 10 PUR3d ^1 (PSCNM 1957) .
2.

In cases (such as the instant one) where a public

utility is created by a developer incidental to the subdivision
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MISCELLANEOUS
26.

Pursuant to the Stipulation (Exhibit 1, as amended

on the record), certain monies were collected by Dean Becker,
attorney for the Homeowners, and placed in his trust account.

To

date, the Division has been unable to obtain from Mr. Becker an
exact accounting of the amounts collected and disbursed from his
trust account.

It is reasonable for Mr. Becker to provide the

Commission with a detailed accounting of all monies collected and
disbursed on behal^ of Foothills and its customers.
27.

The Commission

finds

that

it is reasonable

and

necessary for it to review and approve any proposed future lease
or sale agreements for the provision of water to Applicant's
service area.
23.

The Commission finds that the Revenues, Expenses

and Rate Structure set xorth in Appendix A (made a part thereof
by reference) are just and reasonable.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

In Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public

Service Commission, 614 P.2d 1242 (1980), the Utah Supreme Court
stated the general rule as to burden of proof is hearing before
the Commission:
In the regulation of public utilities by
governmental authority, a fundamental principle is: the burden rests heavily upon a
utility to prove it is entitled to rate
relief and not upon the commission, the
commission staff, or any interested party cr
protestant; to prove the contrary. A utility
has the burden of proof to demonstrate its
nrnnnsed increase in rates and charges is
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457, 1° PUR4th 548, 219 SE2d 56; Re Princess Anne Utilities Corp.
(1969) 81 PUR3d

201; Re Kaanapali Water Corp., 673 P?c 584

(Hawaii, 1984) .
If

a developer agrees to provide a specified water

system, one meeting the standards of the Salt Lake County Kator
Conservancy District, the Commission mav properly exclude
rate base the cost of installing the system promisee

r

ron

if the

utility does not sustain its burden of demonstrating the cost or
the system was not recovered in lot sales.
3.

The Commission's authority over contracts entered

into between public utilities and other parties derives from four
sources:
a.

The Commission's General Jurisdiction. U.C.A.

Section 54-3-1 mandates that the Commission assure that charges
made...bv any public utility...for any product...shall be just
and reasonable.

Section 54-4-1 vests the Commission with:

power and jurisdiction to supervise and
regulate every public utility...to supervise
all of the business of every such public
utility in this state, and to do all things,
whether herein specifically designated or in
addition thereto, which are necessary cr
convenient in the exercise of such power and
jurisdiction.
The Utah Supreme Court recently construed the general powers o£
the Commission in Kearns-Tribune Corporation v. Public Service
Commission (No. 19203, filed May 1, 1984):
...Any activities of a utility that actuaMy
affect its rate structure would necessarily
be subject to some degree to the PSC's broad
supervisory powers in relation to rates. The
question, then, is whether the activity the
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closely connected to its supervision of the
utility's rates and whether the manner of the
regulation is reasonably related to the
legitimate
legislative
purpose
of
rate
control for the protection of the consumer.
Although

the Court

in the Kearns-Tribune

case held

that the

Commission did not have the power to regulate utility conduct
which was peripheral to the setting of rates (tagline requirements) , in the instant case jurisdiction over the Well Lease
Agreement

is directly related

to setting

just and

reasonable

rates.
In Garkane Power Association v. Public Service Commission, 681 P.2d 1207 (1984), the Utah Supreme Court discussed the
Commission's jurisdiction over contracts entered into by public
utilities:
There can be no doubt that not every contract
entered into by a public utility is subject
to the jurisdiction of the PSC. Many contracts for the purchase of supplies and
equipment, and other contracts dealing with
the ordinary conduct of a business, are
contracts that could be litigated only in a
district court not before the PSC. However,
this dispute is clearly one that involves the
validity of electric rates...
In a separate opinion, Justice Durham (concurring and dissenting)
went on to state:
There is no question that the PSC has the
authority to investigate, interpret and even
alter contracts. That question was settled
in an early series of cases brought iust
after the enactment of Utah's Public Utility
Act.
In each case, the Public Utility
Commission (PUC%- found a contract, executed
before the institution of the PUC, in
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violation of a subsequently filed rate. This
Court upheld the PUC's alteration of the
contracts, holding that the regulation of
public utility rates was an exercise of the
state's police power and was not an unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations. (See cases cited)
Justice Durham went on to quote with

approval

from Arkansas

Natural Gas Co. v. Arkansas Railroad Commission, 2 61 U.S. 3 7 9
(1923) , where the United States Supreme Court stated:
The power to fix rates... is for the public
welfare, to which private contracts must
yield... (at 383)
We conclude that the Commission has the authority ur/"er
Soction 54-4-1 to interpret and apply the Well T.-ease Agreement as
set

forth

in

its Findings

and

that

such

interpretation

and

application are reasonable.
b.
54-4-4.

The Commissions Authority Under U.C.A. Section

This section grants the Commission authority to investi-

gate and modify unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or preferential rates, fares, rules, regulations, practices or contracts of
a public utility.

This section is generally understood to apply

to contracts (tariffs) between a utility and its customers and we
therefore conclude

that it is not applicable to our present

inquiry.
c.
54-4-26.

The Commission's Authority Under U.C.A. Section

This section grants the Commission authority to require

a public utility to obtain Commission approval before entering
into any contract requiring a utility expenditure and withhold
approval

of the contract

if the Commission

finds

it is not

CASS NO. 85-2010-01
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"proposed in good faith for the economic benefit of such public
utility."

Although the Commission has in Rule A67-05-95 of the

Administrative Rules of the state of Utah

(General Order 95)

restricted the application of Section 54-5-26 to specific situations , we conclude that since Applicant was a de_ facto public
utility since 1972, it was subject to the Commission's powers
under this section.

Since the failure of Applicant to become

certified made it impossible for the Commission to become aware
of the terms of the Well Lease Agreement before it was executed,
the Commission concludes it has the power to review that cor.tr~.ct
and withhold its approval now.

We conclude that the Well Lease

Agreement was not proposed in good faith for the economic benefit
of Foothills and that the Commission is empowered to interpret
and apply the Well Lease Agreement as set forth in its Findings
and that such interpretation and application are reasonable.
d.
Under

Section

The Definition

54-2-1 (30) (c) .

of the Term
This

"Public Utility"

subsection, as

amended

in

1985, states:
(c) If any person or corporation performs any
service for or delivers any commodity to any
public utility as defined in this section,
each person or corporation is considered to
be a public utility and is subject to the
jurisdiction and regulation of the commission
and this title.
Although Jesse Dansie, as the supplier of the water to Foothills
clearly falls within the purview of this subsection, and could be
declared a public utility by this Commission
been,

were

it

deemed

necessary),

we

(and would have

conclude

that

such

a

CASE NO. 85-^010-01
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determination is unnecessary in view of the Commission's jurisdiction over the Well Lease Agreement under sections 54-5-1 and
54-4-26 as set forth above.
4.

The Commission does not have the power to settle

disputes as to ownership of utility property.

It is the general

rule that assets no-*- ownod by a public utility canno- be included
in rate base; where title to utility property is disputed the
courts are divided.
(Idaho, 1923);

See, e.g., Re Consumers Co. , PUR1923A, 418

Re Capital Citv Water Co., PUR"9 25D, 41 (Mo.

1925); Re HiVcrest Water Co., 5 Ann. Rep. Ohio PUC 57 (Ohio
191 ~!; Frackville Taxpayers' Assoc, v. Frackville Sewage Co. , ~
PUR(NS) 515 (Pa., 1934^.
5.

The $3,000 allowed Applicant for attorney's

r

ees

should be capitalized over a period of three vears.
6.

Applicant is entitled to an increase in its rates

and charges in order to collect total revenues in the amount of
$5^,260.

The rates and charges set forth in the Findings of Fact

and Appendix A are just and reasonable, do not reflect inflationary expectations, and are the minimum necessar; to enable
Applicant to render adequate service and meet current and expected demand.
Based upon the foregoing, the Administrative Law Judge
now recommends the following:
ORDER
NOT«7, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicant be,
and

the

same

hereby

is, authorized

to

publish

its

tariff

CASE NO. 35-2010-01
reincorporating the rates and charges as set forth in the Findings
of Fact and Appendix A, which is attached hereto and incorporated
by reference.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dean H. Becker, Attorney,
file with this Commission, within thirty (30) days of the issuance of this Order, an exact accounting of all amounts collected
and disbursed from his trust account or any other accounts on
behalf of Foothills or its customers.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Foothills obtain approval
from this Commission before entering into any future lease or
sales agreements for the provision of water to Foothills1 service
area or any amendment tc or assignment of any lease or sales
agreement that is now in force and effect.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the legal description of
Applicant's service area shall be as follows:
BEGINNING at Northeast corner of the Southwest quarter
of the Southwest quarter of Section 33, Township 3
South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
running thence:
A.

West to the Northwest corner of the Southwest quarter
of the Southwest quarter of said Section 33;

B.

South to the Northeast corner of Section 5, Township 4
South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;

C.

West to the Northwest corner of the Northeast quarter
of the Northeast quarter of said Section 5;

D.

South to the Southwest corner of the Northeast quarter
of the Northeast quarter of said Section 5;

E.

West tc the Northwest corner of the Southwest quarter
of the Northwest quarter of said Section 5;

F.

South to the Southwest corner of said Section 5;

CASE NO, 85-2010-01
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East to the Southeast corner of the Southwest quarter
of the Southwest quarter of said Section 5;
North to the Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter
of the Southwest quarter of said Section 5;
East to the center of said Section 5;
South to the Southwest corner of the Northwest quarter
of the Southeast quarter of said Section 5;
East to the Souther-nt corner of the Northeast quarter
of the Southeast quarter of said Section 5;
S^uth to the Southwest corner of Lot 103, Hi-Country
Estates Subdivision;
Southeasterly to the Southeast corner of said Let 103;
Northeasterly along East property line of Lots ""OS and
102, Hi-Country Estates Subdivision; to the West line
of the Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of
Section 4, T4S, R2W;
South to the Southwest corner of the Southeast quarter
of the Southwest quarter of said Section 4;
East to the Southeast corner of the Southwest quarter
of the Southeast quarter of said Section 4;
North to the Northeast corner o r the Southwest quarter
of the Southeast quarter of said Section 4;
West to the Northwest comer of the Southwest quarter
of the Southeast quarter of said Section 4;
North to the North quarter comer of said Section 4;
East to the Southeast corner of Lot 1A, Ki-Country
Estates Subdivision;
North to the South boundary of Hi-Countrv Read;
Easterly along the South boundary of Ki-Country Road to
the South boundary of Highway U-lll;
Northwesterly along South boundary of Highway U-lll to
the North line of the Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 33 T3S, R2W;
West to the point of beginning.

CASE NO. 35-2010-01
-38IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Applicant be, and the same
hereby is, authorised to publish its new tariff effective on one
day's notice to the public and Commission;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order be, and the same
hereby is, effective on issuance.
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day of March,
1986.

/s/Kent Walgren
Administrative Law Judge
Approved and confirmed this 17th day of March, 1936, as
the Report and Order of the Commission.

(SEAL>
Attest:
Is! Georgia B, Peterson
Executive Secretarv

Is!

Frer.t H. Cameron, Chairman

Is!

James M, Byrne, Commissioner

Is!

Brian T. Stev/art, Commissioner

EXHIBIT C

R O B E R T A . B E N T L E Y (0249^
A t t o r n e y for Hi-Country-'Honiedwn €t$
50 West B r o a d w a y , #1000
Salt Lake C i t y , UT
84101
Telephone:
(801) 328-9085

r

Associat ion

B E F O R E THE P U B L I C SERVICE C O M M I S S I O N

In The M a t t e r of the Petition
of the H i - C o u n t r y H o m e o w n e r s
A s s o c i a t i o n for a Declaratory
O r d e r in re: Standby Fees

OF

UTAH

PETITION
Case No.

88-2010-01

This is an Petition for a D e c l a r a t o r y Order pursuant

to UCA 63-

46a-155 and for the recision or amendment of a decision of the Public
S e r v i c e Commission
controversy

for purpose

between

of determining

the parties

a question

as hereinafter

more

Petitioner, Hi-Country Homeowners Association
54-7-13

and

UCA

determining
contained

63-46A-15

that

the

dated M a r c h

exceeds

the

scope

and Order

17, 1986 and
of

a Declaratory

Readiness-to-Serve

in the Report

Walgren

seeks

fully

Order

appears.
to UCA

finding

(standby

of A d m i n i s t r a t i v e

the C o m m i s s i o n s

actual

pursuant

charges

the Tariff

of

and
fees)

Law Judge

Kent

of Foothills Water

jurisdiction

and

Co.

authority,

contains an an unjust and u n r e a s o n a b l e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of service and
is

further

violative

of

the

14th Amendment

of

the US

Constitution

and A r t i c l e 1 §2 of the C o n s t i tut ion of the State of Utah.
of said P e t i t i o n , P e t i t i o n e r s
1.

Petitioner

allege as

is a Utah non-profit

In support

follows:
corporation

consisting

of

the h o m e o w n e r s of H i - C o u n t r y Estates s u b d i v i s i o n , Phase I located a
few miles

southeast

the a r t i c l e s ,
all

of H e r i m a n , Salt Lake C o u n t y , U T .

bylaws

lot owners whether

and

Protective Covenants

developed

or undeveloped

of

the

Pursuant

to

Association,

are members

of

the

rYHTRTT

r

association.

The association

representing
2.
entered

the

interests

On M a r c h
a Report

of all

lot

charged with

the duty

of

owners.

17, 1986 A d m i n i s t r a t i v e

Law

and O r d e r w h i c h was a p p r o v e d

C o m m i s s i o n on the same day.
as

is likewise

Judge

Kent

Walgren

and confirmed

by

On page 26, p a r a g r a p h 22 the Judge

the

found

follows:

"Standby Fees:
In both the Timber Lakes Water case and the Silver
S p r i n g s W a t e r case (Nos 8 2 - 0 7 6 - 0 1 and 8 5 - 5 7 0 - 0 1 , r e s p e c t i v e l y ) , The
C o m m i s s i o n found that $9.00 per month was a r e a s o n a b l e standby fee.
W e find that $9.00 per m o n t h is also a r e a s o n a b l e standby fee for
Foothills1 customers.
S i n c e the standby fee was set at $10.00 per
m o n t h in the C o m m i s s i o n ' s Intermin O r d e r , A p p l i c a n t shall credit
$1.00 per m o n t h to standby c u s t o m e r s w h o have paid the $10.00 amount
during the interim p e r i o d .
The standby charges will thus g e n e r a t e
$ 9 . 0 0 per m o n t h x 12 m o n t h s x 54 c u s t o m e r s = $ 5 , 8 3 2 . "
Pursuant

to that finding the Standby

of the F o o t h i l l s W a t e r C o . T a r i f f ,
3.
way

attached

P r o p e r t y owners were notified

of a M e m o r a n d u m

from R a l p h

of P u b l i c U t i l i t i e s .
as Exhibit
4.

fee was

included oi ; age 2

hereto as exhibit

the same day of the charge by

N. C r e e r ,

Director

A copy of said m e m o r a n d u m

of

the

hereto

B.

The T a r i f f

1986 M e m o r a n d u m

itself does not specify whether

states

that

undeveloped

property within

The

has

Utility

taken

the

fee

the p o s i t i o n

lots. The M a r c h

is a s s e s s e d

the F o o t h i l l s W a t e r
the

the fee applies

against
Co.

the S t a n d b y

w h o have w e l l s and are not on the water system.
the 1st Precient J u s t i c e Court
from both classes

of

owners

service

17,
of

area.

fee a p p l i e s

u n d e v e l o p e d p r o p e r t y owners as well as owners of d e v e l o p e d

fees

Division

is a t t a c h e d

to all lot owners or just to owners of d e v e l o p e d

such

A.

to

property

It has filed suit in

for Salt L a k e C o u n t y , Utah to collect
owners.

5.

At the time the tariff was adopted there were 63 developed

parcels

and

54 undeveloped

lot owners.

The number

of

undeveloped

lot owners was used as the bases for the calculation of the standby
fees, (see exhibit A.)
6.

Petitions

subject

assert

and

to misinterpretation

claim

that

the Tariff

is vague

and

in the following manner:

(a) The tariff does not specify who is liable for Standby
fees.

The

tariff

literally

including actual users.
all

applies

the

standby

fee

to

everyone

The Utility claims that the fee applies to

lots which are not active customers.

The Division has claimed

that the fee only applies to undeveloped lots. All lot owners require
a Declaratory Order specifyingwho, if anyone, is liable for the fees.
(b) The Tariff does not specify who is liable for the $10
late fee assessed to customers who are more than 30 days delinquent.
Although such a late fee may be appropriate for actual customers it
is oppressive, confiscatory and usurious to standby customers whose
maximum monthly bill
interest

is only $9.

The $10 later

fee constitutes an

rate in excess of 110% on standby accounts and as such is

violative of the Utah Consumer Credit Code (UCA 70C-2-102) and other
state

statutes

unconsionable

and

Court

interest

decisions

dealing

with

usurious

and

rates and fees.

(c) Said fees, even if they are found to be appropriate do
not

constitute

unlawful

a lien on

to require any

his predecessors.
(1936).

the property
lot owner

and

it

is thus unjust,

to pay standby

fees

Homeowners Loan Corp. v. Logan City

and

incurred by
92 P.2d 346

own p r i v a t e w e l l s
are n e c e s s a r i l y

it cannot be said that u n d e v e l o p e d p r o p e r t y
future

customers.

(c) A n y

benefit

e x i s t e n c e of the u t i l i t y and
at

some

to such

time

in the future

paid

for

its c a p a c i t y

borne

by all

not, additional
the s y s t e m .

to supply

of

purchasers

the c r e a t i o n

from

the

them w i t h w a t e r
and

nonchargable

of

lot

owners, whether

developers
(ii)

who

use

in the

the water

they

service

system

by

developed

It

who c r e a t e d

cannot

artesian

those

to o w n e r s w h o do rot

be

the

said

water

All

undeveloped

property

lot o w n e r s h a v e

a well

on

their

access

property

T h e u t i l i t y is p r e s e n t l y suing o w n e r s of d e v e l o p e d

their

own

wills

for

water,

asserting

that

they

fees.

Such o w n e r s do not use or benefit

the s y s t e m and do not

intent

to use

(iii) The
is

Administrative

use

system.

that

by d r i l l i n g

or

paid

liable for the s t a n d b y

homeowners

the

lots

in the p r o p e r t y v a l u e s have been

o w n e r s will ever m a k e use of the s y s t e m .

as m a n y h a v e d o n e .

lots

S i n c e the o r i g i n a l c a p i t a l i z a t i o n of the s y s t e m

Any enhancement

to e c o n o m i c a l

of

fees should not be a s s e s s e d

to the o r i g i n a l

lots

receive

is r e m o t e , s p e c u l a t i v e

original

the cost

original developers.
was

noncustomers

owners.
(i) The

area

owners

value

speculative.
Law Judge

In

and

on the basis of the benefit

of

it

in the

are
from

future.

the e x i s t e n c e

of

the

accessing

the

standby

the C o m m i s s i o n

did

not

utility
fee,

calculated

to
the
it

r e c e i v e d by lot o w n e r s but rather on the

r e v e n u e the fee w o u l d p r o v i d e to the u t i l i t y as a m e a n s of o f f s e t t i n g
the rate c h a r g e s

to

customers.

7.
to all

Petitioners
property

the utility are

assert

owners

and claim that

including

inappropriate,

those not

improper

such

fees as they

receiving

and unlawful

apply

service

from

as:

(a) e x c e e d e d the scope of a u t h o r i t y given to the commission
to set

r e a s o n a b l e and

and/or

UCA 5 4 - 3 - 1 .

just

utility

rates as provided

in UCA

54-1-2

(b) C o n s t i t u t i n g an unjust and u n r e a s o n a b l e standard,
classification

of s e r v i c e

to be

and

furnished.

(c) C o n s t i t u t i n g a p r e f e r e n c e and u n r e a s o n a b l e
as to rates and charges between

classes

of service

difference

in violation

of

UCA 5 4 - 3 - 8 ;
(d) u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under the 14th Amendment to the Uni ted
S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and A r t i c l e 1 §2 of the Utah State C o n s t i t u t i o n
as being v i o l a t i v e of the equal p r o t e c t i o n clauses contained therein;
8.

In support
(a) Such

and

denies

lot

classification

of such c l a i m s , P e t i t i o n e r s
fees

owners
is

create
of

the

invidious

an

unconstitutional

equal

and

allege as

protection

arbitrary

of

and bears

follows:

classification
the
no

law.

The

reasonable

r e l a t i o n s h i p to the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a just and fair rate to be paid
by c u s t o m e r s of the u t i l i t y .
little or no r e l a t i o n s h i p
service

Whether

a lot

is d e v e l o p e d or not

to the u t i l i t i e s cost of p r o v i d i n g

has

actual

to its c u s t o m e r s .
(b) It is improper

of p r o p e r t y w h i c h

does

not

s e r v i c e from the u t i l i t y .

to assess a utility fee against a owner
receive

and may

never

elect

to

receive

In light of the a v a i l a b i l i t y of artesian

water and the number of lot owners w h o obtain there water

from their

( i v ) T h e c o n n e c t i o n fee is the proper fee to r e i m b u r s e
the u t i l i t y
set

at

for

its r e a d i n e s s

$750 exceeds

to s e r v e .

the a c t u a l

cost

The connection

of

connection.

fee p r e s e n t

It

is

through

this fee that p r o s p e c t i v e users s h o u l d pay for a c c e s s to the s y s t e m .
O n l y this fee p r o p e r l y d i r e c t s the cost of the s e r v i c e b e i n g a v a i l a b l e
to t h o s e w h o w i s h

to use

it.

(v) T o the extent
generate

revenue

improperly

the

subsidizing

that

undeveloped
the

the s t a n d b y

lot

users

of

and
the

fee

is n e e d e d

off-system
system

owners

through

the

T h o s e o w n e r s are not s t a n d i n g by for s e r v i c e in even the most
use of the term.

T h e y are at best are p o t e n t i a l

and as such are c o m p a r a b l e
area

who

may

Estates

and

utility

must

at

some

request

point

water

maintain

to n o n r e s i d e n t s
in

the

buy

that

time.

s e r v i c e at

capacity

to

serve

users of the

such

lots

in

fee.

system
service

Hi-Country

T o the extent
lots,

are

liberal

of the u t i l i t i e s

future

to

the

cost

the
of

m a i n t a i n i n g that c a p a c i t y s h o u l d be r e c o u p e d at the time of c o n n e c t i o n
through

the c o n n e c t i o n

fee.

W H E R E F O R E , Pet i t i o n e r s pray that the C o m m i s s ion rev iew its M a r c h
17,

1983 R e p o r t

the t a r i f f
1.

and O r d e r

thereunder

and

in the a b o v e

entitled

issue an O r d e r

matter

declaring

as

along

with

follows:

T h e the S t a n d b y fees are a improper m e a n s of r a i s i n g

revenue

for a u t i l i t i e s o p e r a t ing e x p e n s e s , O r d e r the u t i l i t y to stop a s s e s s i n g
such fees and r e t u r n all fees p r e v i o u s l y c o l l e c t e d to the p a y o r , a n d / o r
2. C l a r i f y
whether
and

standby

the $10

late

which

lot

owners

are

fee, and

owners
liable

are
for

liable
the

for

standby

fees of prior

fees,
lot

and

owners

3.
be just

S u c h other and further relief as the C o m m i s s i o n may find to
and r e a s o n a b l e

D A T E D this

(dlH

in the p r e m i s e s .

day of M a r c h

1988.

Robert A. Bentley
/
A t t o r n e y for P e t i t i o n e r s

MAILING
I hereby
foregoing

certify

Petition

that

by

Attorney

Latimer

185 S o . S t a t e

Coulam,

Attorney

for

for

I mailed

first

Antczak,

class

Foothills
#700

Division

8 4 1 1 4 on this

l/)Jtt

a true and correct
mail,

Water

Salt

A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , S t a t e of Utah
UT

CERTIFICATE

postage

of

prepaid,

Company,

Lake City
Public

UT.

Parsons,
84111

j£l

B.

the
Val

Behle

of

&
T.
the

Salt Lake C i t y ,

1988.

(<*^

to

and Dale

Utilities, Office

236 S t a t e C a p i t o l

day of M a r c h ,

copy of

z?

FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY
P.O. Box 477
Riverton, Utah 84065
I

Utah P.S.C. 2nd Revised Sheet No.
Superseding Original Sheet No.

A. SERVICE RATE SCHEDULE
APPLICABILITY

Applicable in entire service area to water service for culinary
and domestic purposes at one point of delivery for use at a
single dwelling unit, and for commercial purposes at a single
business connection.
RATE
Usage

|

Chan3es

First 5,000 gallons

$37,75 minimum charge for each
service connection

All additional gallons

$ 2.40 per 1,000 gallons

SERVICE CONNECTION FEE
=U^\

3/4" Service to Property Line,,
I
one-time charge for each lot requiring c
new meter installation, to be
*\
paid in full before water service
J
will be provided.
-*s

$750.00

ANNUAL STANDBY FEE
Monthly Standby Fee (Ready-to-Serve Charge)*

$ 9.00

OTHER CHARGES
1. Turn-on service for new customer
where meter is already in place
2. Reconnection fee after disconnection
3. Account transfer charge
4. Meter tested
15. Customer late fee (Applied to customers
bill when current month's bill is 30
days delinquent)
6. Service Deposit
7. Returned check charge

$ 50.00
$ 50.00
$ 25.00
$ 10.00

. ^
'p*L "

$ 10.00
$100.00
$ 10.00

(N)

1*
The annual standby fee may be paid monthly or annually in
J advance by March 1st of each year and any unpaid balance
J arising from this fee shall bear interest at 1 1/2% per month.
Any unpaid standby fees for a particular premise, including
those fees incurred by prior owners, along with any accumulated
J interest, must be paid in full before water service will be
J provided.
Advice Letter No.
Case No. 85-2010-01

Date Filed
5/29/87
Effective Date 6/1/87
Foothills Water Company

J
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EXHIBIT D

<

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In the Matter of the Request )
of FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY for)
an Increase in Rates.
)

%

%

CASE NO. 88-2010-01
ORDER

ISSUED:

March 28. 1988

Appearances:
Dale T. Coulam,
Assistant Attorney
General

For

Division of Public
Utilities, Department of
Business Regulation,
State of Utah

Val R. Antczak

"

Foothills Water Company

Robert A Bentley

"

Homeowners' Association

By the Commission:
Pursuant to notice duly served, Applicant's Motion for
Stay of Further Proceedings came on for hearing on the 22nd day of
March, 1988, before the Commission at its offices at 160 East 300
South, Salt Lake City, Utah.

After consideration of written and

oral arguments from the above-named parties, the Commission issues
the following
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That Applicant's
Motion for Stay of Further Proceedings is granted and this matter
shall be stayed until final resolution of the Quiet Title action
presently pending before the Third Judicial District Court for the
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the Division shall continue
its investigation of Applicant, to the extent possible, in preparation for expedited further proceedings in this matter following

CASE NO. 88-2010-01
- 2 District

Court

action

including, but not limited to, a monthly

review (as opposed to actual compilation) of Applicant's books and
records to verify that Applicant is maintaining such records in an
appropriate manner.
DATED in Salt Lake City, Utah this 28th day of March,
1988.
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Brent H. Cameron, Commissioner

{ U<1«^<? fr*.

t ^

s/

Jam^s M. Byrne, Commissioner
Attest:

Jtephen C. Hewlett
Stephen
Commission Secretary

